श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यसदानन्दप्रणीतः

वेदान्तसारः

VEDĀNTA-SĀRA

A work on Vedanta Philosophy

By

Sadananda

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION

AND

EXPLANATORY NOTES

BY

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१२	१८	प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्या-द्वितीयवस्तुनः	प्रकरण-प्रतिपाद्यस्य वस्तुनः

विषयानुक्रमः (Contents)

PREFACE

The **Vedanta-sara** is often prescribed as a text-book for University students, and it is mainly for their use that the present edition has been prepared. The text is divided into paragraphs to mark the chief topics considered, all further differentiations of the subject-matter being indicated by a double vertical line or stop. The analysis of the contents given in the beginning will, it is hoped, be helpful in the study of the book.

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INTRODUCTION.

After the usual prayer for the successful completion of the work undertaken and the salutation to his *guru*, our author begins by stating the qualifications required of a person that desires to enter upon a study of the Vedānta and then sets forth at some length the teaching of the Upaniṣads whose central truth, according to Advaita, is contained in what are known as *mahā-vākyas* such as *Tat tvam asi*. This truth, even when imparted by the best of teachers, will necessarily be known only mediately; but Indian thinkers were never content with such knowledge and they always insisted upon the necessity for the disciple to realise in his own life the truth so known.* The author accordingly proceeds to explain the nature of the discipline necessary for the realisation—a discipline not less arduous than the one qualifying for Vedāntic study, and concludes with a description of *jīvan-mukti* or the condition of one that has fully undergone it and has succeeded in transforming the mediate knowledge of Upaniṣadic truth into immediate experience. We shall deal with these four topics in order—(1) the preliminary training, (2) the teaching of the Vedānta, (3) the discipline necessary for its realisation, and (4) the condition of *jīvan-mukti*.

(1) The training which a Vedāntic disciple is expected to have received before entering upon his study is partly moral and partly intellectual. To understand the exact character of the former it is necessary to know the triple classification of deeds that is generally implied, if not actually adopted, in Hindu works:—(*i*) those described as *sādhāraṇa-dharmas* which comprise acts, indicative of virtues like kindness and truth-speaking, and are equally

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* Cf. *e.g.* *Pañcadaśī*, xi. 84.

obligatory on all* ; (*ii*) those termed *varṇāśrama-dharmas* which are relative in their conception and depend upon one's social class (*varṇa*) and upon the specific stage one has reached in life's discipline (*āśrama*) ; and (*iii*) those that are known as *kāmya-karmas* which are explicitly designed to secure personal benefit here or hereafter and therefore vary according to the capacity and inclination of the individual. It is not necessary to say anything about the need of the first of these as their importance is universally acknowledged and their observance is admitted to be the first condition of success in moral training.† Nor is it necessary to speak about the third set, as their value in ethical training is only preparatory and indirect. It will suffice merely to remark about them that they should not involve, ordinarily speaking, either in the means they adopt or in the result they aim at, any violation of the principle underlying the other two varieties of *karma*. It is only the second set of *karmas* that require some explanation here. If we overlook minor distinctions,‡ we may describe them as *nitya-karmas* or deeds that should necessarily be performed and may therefore be termed 'duties'. The Hindu view as to what deeds constitute this class is for the most part determined by tradition and so may appear arbitrary or conventional in their character. The reason for this is not far to seek. General precepts as regards what one ought to do are not of much avail until they are reduced to a concrete form by reference to particular sets of social

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* Compare *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, I. iv. 122 :—

अहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयं शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः ।
दानं दमो दया शान्तिस्सर्वेषां धर्मसाधनम् ॥

† Compare *Parāśara-smṛti*, I. i. 37 :—

चतुर्णामपि वर्णानामाचारो धर्मपालकः ।
आचारभ्रष्टदेहानां भवेद्धर्मः पराङ्मुखः ॥

Also *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, ii. 24, and Śaṁkara's commentary on *Vedānta-sūtra*, III. i. 10.

‡ For the distinction between *nitya-* and *naimittika-karmas* and *prāyascitta*, see Notes.

circumstances; but when so reduced, they acquire in course of time—especially when the community in question is experiencing a lull in progress—a certain sanctity and come to be viewed as binding though the conditions to which they were suited have ceased to exist. They are then looked upon as even possessing a support in revelation. It is in this stage that we now find the generality of the deeds included in the Hindu conception of *nitya-karmas* and that explains why many of them appear as formal to us now. But whatever historical explanation we may give of them, it is clear from their very name of *varṇāśrama-dharmas* that they were intended to secure common as distinguished from purely personal welfare. We may accordingly take them as standing for social duties which in one form or another are necessarily found in all communities. For us who are studying the place of these deeds in a scheme of moral training and not their character as social institutions, or their fitness for present-day conditions, it is this general aspect alone that is relevant. We are concerned not so much with *what* these duties are as with *how* they conduce to moral life. So we shall leave out of consideration whatever may be accidental in them and confine our attention to their general character. Their importance for us consists especially in their binding character—in their restricting human activity to certain courses rather than to others and in their implication that man must not act as he wishes but that, on the contrary, he must often do what he dislikes and refrain from doing what he likes—that, in one word, he must submit his will to the will of others. These deeds accordingly resemble those of the first type whose importance in moral training, as we have already said, is universally recognised. But there is one important difference, *viz.*, that while the latter are obligatory on all irrespective of age or rank, the former are so, on particular classes or groups only. While the *sādhāraṇa-dharmas*, as their name indicates, are the same for all, these differ in different cases. Though not obligatory on all, their binding character is not the less on those to whom they apply.

Before we describe the course of moral training prescribed for the would-be disciple of Vedānta, we must refer to another point about *nitya-karmas*. These deeds, whatever their particular nature may be, we have said, are beneficial to society. Are they useful to the individual also who performs them? That they indirectly benefit him goes without saying; for he being a member of society, its well-being necessarily means his well-being also. The question now is whether they bring him any good over and above this indirect benefit. The common view is that they have no such result but only that their neglect leads to sin (*pratyavāya*);* and they are consequently described as disinterested activity. But other answers also have been given by Indian thinkers; and the Advaitin is of opinion that they are directly beneficial to the individual and cannot therefore be described as 'disinterested' in the literal sense of the term. He maintains that voluntary activity is inconceivable without such an aim. Even the first set of duties such as kindness are so, according to him. They both involve a good for him that practises them, as certainly as they do for others; but that good differs in an essential respect from what the *kāmya-karmas* fetch—in that it is *the same* in all and not different in different cases.† This common benefit is what is known as 'cleansing of the heart' (*sattva-śuddhi*) which signifies the elimination of selfish impulses, *viz.*, narrow love and hate.‡ They are thus not an end in themselves even from the standpoint of the doer, but a means to something else—the spiritual uplift of the individual. Thus if we describe the activities included in the first two classes as 'duty', the Advaitin does not hold the maxim 'Duty for duty's sake' as literally true.

The ethical training of a Hindu may be viewed as comprising two stages—one in which the performance of *kāmya-karmas* is permitted and the other in which it is not. The activities of the first two types are throughout

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* See, for instance, Śaṁkara's Introduction to *Tait. Upaniṣad*.

† See Śaṁkara on *Br. Up.* I. ii. 1. p. 57 (Ānandāśrama Edition).

‡ Compare *Pañcadaśī* xi. 116.

obligatory, as also of course desistance from the *pratiṣiddha* or forbidden acts. The sphere of conduct thus comes to be restricted, as we might put it, to the 'ought' in the second stage while it includes also the 'right' in the first. Though the first two classes of deeds are common to the two stages of training, there is an important difference between the spirit in which they are carried out in them. In the earlier it is their social character that is put prominently before one. Social well-being is the willed end and any good that may accrue to the individual is altogether secondary. In the later, the end is subjective purification and social well-being becomes only its necessary consequence. The former stage of this training is taken for granted by our author and he begins by setting forth the latter. And the fact that it is the *second* stage shows that what Deussen describes* as the 'objective worth' of actions is not ignored in the scheme of Vedāntic discipline as a whole. Ignorance of this point has often led critics to describe the Vedāntic outlook on life as individualistic. But it is certainly not so, as it is only a person that has passed through the earlier stage with its emphasis on social morality that is expected and is able to enter upon the later. Moreover the fact noticed above that all these *karmas* serve but the same aim implies, when we remember that it is so not merely in the case of any one person but in that of all, a deeper basis for them in human nature, and points to their result as a good which all alike seek. Men may differ in their views as regards other matters but all of them are agreed in regard to the desirability of spiritual well-being.† Though ceasing to be social in the accepted sense, these *karmas*, when performed in this new spirit, become social in a much higher sense in that they follow the instinct of mankind in general and their result, *viz.*, the cleansing of the heart, when effected in the case of one will help others by serving as an example for them to follow. It is the successful completion of this stage that constitutes, so

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* See *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 364.

† See Com.: *Bāla-bodhinī*, p. 22.

far as the moral side is concerned, the necessary condition for Vedāntic discipleship.

The intellectual part of the training consists in the study of the Veda and of works subsidiary to it with a view to acquire a general acquaintance with Vedāntic truth. It also includes necessarily the educational training leading up to it which secures for the student a certain attitude of the mind—an interest in truth (*pramātṛtva*). But more particularly the training on this side has reference to the practice of meditation (*upāsanā*) with a view to learn how to control the mind. The Upaniṣads abound in meditative exercises of various kinds. The objects for meditation may be external or internal and among both—especially the former—the range is very wide, so that practically anything may be selected for the purpose from a common object to a cosmic power like the Sun or even God Almighty (*saguṇa-brahman*). The variety of the exercises renders possible a careful gradation of the training by which progress becomes feasible on this difficult path. The differentiation between the intellectual and moral sides of the training which we have made here, it is necessary to add, is merely for convenience of treatment, for the two are interdependent and the performance of the so-called moral deed serves as training for the mind, as meditation helps the betterment of moral nature.

Success in this training as a whole is indicated by the appearance in the disciple of the following traits which are described as the 'four-fold aid' (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*) to the study of Vedānta :—

(*i*) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः—This is ability to discriminate between the transient and the eternal or to appraise correctly the worth of things. In one sense this no doubt is the result of Brahma-realisation and cannot therefore be an aid to it. But it is possible, even before such realisation, to feel convinced *in general* that there are things of permanent as opposed to those of provisional value and that it is the former alone that matter in the end. It is such conviction that is intended here which sets the disciple on the path to find out the eternal

element in life, and not the actual enlightenment which would end the quest once for all. This qualification is stated at the very outset to show that the other three that follow should be rooted in it. Moral worth not thus supported by wisdom may be adequate for lower levels of life but not for realising the goal of existence. In other words, while all morality has its basis in metaphysics. it is only implicit in social morality but becomes explicit at this higher stage.

(*ii*) इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः—This is absence of desire for securing happiness or avoiding pain here or elsewhere. It is detachment from all selfish ends—the result of a conviction got from long experience that their pursuit brings no final satisfaction.

(*iii*) शमादिसाधनसंपत्—These are six of which the first two, *viz*., *śama* and *dama* respectively represent the control of the mind and of the senses. They may together be taken as standing for temperance of thought. Temperance of act is *uparati* which is renunciation in spirit, if not also in fact. The next one, *titikṣā*, is fortitude—a form of courage shown in enduring opposites like heat and cold or pain and pleasure. *Samādhānam* is power of concentration which indicates that the discipline has been mental also. It signifies that moral improvement without a parallel improvement of the mind is not adequate to reach the ideal. The last of them, *śraddhā*, is faith in the teaching imparted. It is loyalty to the ideal or respect for truth which means readiness to work for its achievement and is a great help in securing stability of effort. It is a form of reverence and need not necessarily be opposed to reason. It only excludes vacillation of mind that leads to constant shifting of ideals.

(*iv*) मुमुक्षुत्वम्—Desire for self-realisation.

These qualifications are mostly negative though one or two like *titikṣā* may be viewed as positive. But we must remember that their final aim is positive, being self-realisation. The negative discipline of the four-fold aid finds its fulfilment in this positive aim and is indispensable for it as receding, we might say, is for taking

a leap. The narrow self is suppressed but only to win the wider one. The qualifications also appear as individualistic and may be taken to imply a neglect of social morality. But we have already seen that this is the result of a training which puts in the forefront the discharge of social duties and that while it may indicate that social morality is at a certain stage transcended, it in no way means that it has been ignored.

(2) All philosophy starts from experience and aims at giving a satisfactory explanation of it. However we may explain it eventually, it should be admitted that experience points to a world of great diversity as existing outside. The outside world thus given, as a little reflection will show, is at least in part dependent upon the percipient. If a person looks, for instance, at a hill from one position, it presents a certain shape ; and if he shifts his position sufficiently with reference to it, that shape changes. So also does the colour of the hill. If he stands close to it, it probably appears as grey ; but if at a long distance, it takes on a bluish hue. It is easy to see that the same applies to various other features of it also, so that it is very difficult to say what the hill in itself really is. Such a view may cast a serious doubt even on the very being of the object. But though we must admit that some of its aspects vary according to our position with reference to it, the reality of the hill itself need not be questioned, for there are others like us that vouch for it. It may be said that these others also are given only in our experience and that we are begging the question in assuming their reality. There would of course be nothing logically wrong in such a criticism. For aught we know, the world as a whole is a delusion and we are only dreaming, in which case what is given is but our own self with its notions or ideas which it fondly imagines correspond to objects existing outside. There would then be neither an external world nor other selves. That would be solipsism and some among the followers of Advaita have taken this short cut to Truth !* Although such a theory

* See, *e.g.*, *Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha*, pp. 105-6 (Kumbhakonam Edition).

is not strictly refutable, it certainly strains common sense too much; and, what is worse, it reduces the ordinary activities of life to an absurdity. Hence we may begin by assuming that our object, *viz.*, the hill is there outside as also other selves, although we are not yet in a position to say what that object and those selves are—or, for the matter of that, what even our own self is. All that we have to note at this stage clearly is that though the object in some of its aspects is dependent upon the percipient, it is not entirely so, the reason being the common assurance of other selves whose existence we have chosen to admit. If we extend our view from a single object to the world as experienced by us, we see that there are also other ways in which it is defective. Thus it is invariably limited both in time and space. For example, the universe as we experience it here to-day is almost quite different from that which those at the antipodes did last century. But though each man's universe is thus more or less different and fragmentary, we may take for granted, as indeed we ordinarily do, that there is a common background for them all. There is and has been such a background but each self experiences only a particular aspect of it which in that precise form no other self can. Each of us encounters what may be described as the 'public' world but takes only a 'private' view of it.*

For us who are trying to discover the ultimate implication of experience and are concerned with the whole of Being, the personal aspects of the universe are not of so much importance as their common background to which accordingly we shall confine our attention in the sequel. There is one feature of it which can be deduced at once: the separate universes with which we are severally familiar are inert or non-sentient (*jaḍa*) and the common world implied by them all, we may conclude, is also of the same nature. In other words, it is objective in character. Now it is a principle generally recognised by idealists that what is objective or not mental in character

* These universes are respectively described as *Īśa-sṛṣṭa* and *jīva-sṛṣṭa*. See *Pañcadaśī*, iv. 19, ff.

should be dependent in some sense or other upon mind. That is, it cannot be ultimate. Now this principle leads us to postulate some mind or consciousness on which that common world depends. That mind must be infinitely wider in its scope than anything represented by the individual subjects. In fact it should be the cosmic or universal subject, becoming aware of all that is and of everything precisely as it is. In other words, its knowledge should be both complete and correct. If it also should involve a private or personal view, it would be an addition to the *jīvas* in existence, and would not represent what we are seeking. We have now to settle a very important question: In what relation does this universal subject stand to the particular *jīvas*? It cannot be identical with any one of them; nor can it be altogether different from and external to them, for then its knowledge, though it may comprehend the whole of the physical universe, would still be defective since it cannot know the *jīvas* in the required manner, no direct or complete knowledge of one spirit by another being possible. It should therefore have to be both identical and different from them. In explaining this relation our book utilizes the analogy of space which may be conceived as divided into parts by suitable limiting adjuncts or as reflected in parts in a suitable medium. It compares the individual self to the space occupied by a single tree and the universal subject to that occupied by the forest as a whole of which the tree is a constituent factor; or alternatively, it compares the former to a part of the sky reflected in a given area of water in a lake and the latter to the same as reflected in the whole sheet of water there.* This suggests the relation to be that between a whole and its parts. But a whole may be viewed as an aggregate of its parts or as an entity by itself. If we should take it in the former sense, the universal self will become a collection of the individual selves. Such an interpretation, however, will not do as a collection of selves

* These illustrations are based upon a well-known difference of opinion among Advaitins regarding the nature of *jīva* and *Īśvara* in relation to *avidyā* and *Māyā*, known as *avaccheda-vāda* and *pratibimba-vāda*.

can yield only a collective experience which is far from what we understand from complete experience. Further it would, by including all the imperfections of all the individual experiences instead of doing away with them, be reduced to mere chaos. So the conclusion is forced upon us that the universal self must somehow be one and integral, while not altogether different from the individual selves. That is possible only when we look upon the cosmic subject as immanent in them all. That is the significance of the word *samaṣṭi* ('all-pervading') used for it in the book to distinguish it from the individual described as *vyaṣṭi*.*

This common background, to judge from the general character of our 'private' universes, must also be characterised by diversity and the diversity, to judge again from our own experience, must be such as is reducible to unity. For there are two phases in it—one that changes its character almost constantly and the other which endures through the change. The two factors together constitute a unity in diversity and if we take the unitary factor with the elements of diversity latent in it, neither manifest nor wholly abolished, we get what may be described as the material cause of this common universe. Let us call it by the name of *Māyā* postponing for the present the consideration of the reason why we give that name to it. The whole of the physical universe can be epitomised in this single word and it is sometimes a great convenience to deal with a simple conception like that instead of such a complex one, as the physical universe. It is clear from what we have said that *Māyā* is positive (*bhāva-rūpa*) and also heterogeneous in character (*triguṇātmaka*). If we remember that it is dependent upon the universal consciousness, being *jaḍa* like the world that emerges from it, we see that the full explanation of the universe is to be found not in *Māyā* alone which by its very nature cannot

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* These words are derived from '*aś*' 'to pervade' and are strictly applicable only to the adjuncts of spirit and not to spirit itself. For this, as well as for the distinction in the significance when applied to the latter, see Notes.

be ultimate, but in that together with the conciousness or *caitanya* to which it necessarily points. The complex of these two factors is what in Advaita is known as *Īśvara* or *saguṇa-brahman*. *Īśvara* thus conceived, from what we have said so far, appears in two stages—one where the universe is manifest and the other where the variety of it becomes latent in the single principle which we have termed *Māyā*. Now the name *Īśvara*, to speak strictly, is confined to the latter and the former is designated *Vaiśvānara* ('abiding in all beings'), which draws attention to a feature already noticed. It is sometimes described also as *Virāj* on account of its perfectly manifest character. *Īśvara*, it may be said, becomes visible in *Virāj*. To form an easy transition from the one to the other, another stage is introduced where the element of diversity has begun to manifest itself but is not yet fully developed. This intermediate stage is variously styled as *Prāṇa*, *Sūtrātman* or *Hiraṇya-garbha*. It is essential to remember that the spiritual or sentient element in all the three is identical and the only difference is in the adjuncts which respectively are subtle, half-developed and fully manifest *Māyā*. We may describe the complexes of these factors as different on the principle recognised by the Advaitin, *viz.*, that change in the quality (*viśeṣaṇa*) contributes to change in the qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) and the causal relation that exists between them applies only to the complexes or adjuncts and not to the sentient element taken by itself. *Īśvara* or *Māyā* gives rise to *Hiraṇya-garbha* or the universe in its subtle form, which in its turn does, to *Virāj* or the gross universe.*

Parallel to this conception of the cosmic self, we have a three-fold view of the individual self also. In the case of the former, the adjuncts are the whole of the universe in its fully manifest, half-manifest and unmanifest forms; in the case of the latter, on the other hand, the adjunct is

* This is to personify the three stages and to speak of them in religious terms. We may also, if we like, drop the personalisation and look upon them as marking different stages of evolution in the Absolute of philosophy.

only that part of it which constitutes the physical accompaniment of the particular self. This accompaniment also is taken to exhibit three strata of development, *viz.*, *avidyā* (*kāraṇa-śarīra*), the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*), and the gross body (*sthūla-śarīra*). Just as the whole universe is the effect of *Māyā*, the portions of the universe which constitute the gross and subtle bodies of an individual self are conceived as the effects of that particular self's *avidyā* which accordingly becomes a part of *Māyā*.* With these it identifies itself ordinarily but unlike the cosmic self, the individual always has a sphere of reality which it regards as outside itself. It claims only a part and a very small part of it as its own; and assumes an attitude of indifference towards the rest of it. The ideal of morality as conceived in Advaita is to extend this narrow view so that, like the cosmic self, its interests also may coincide with the interests of the universe. This is the significance in particular of the meditation upon the *saguṇa-brahman* referred to in our text.† Now the three *śarīras* of the individual self are predominantly associated with three states of it—the gross body with the waking state, the subtle, with dream and *avidyā*, with dreamless sleep. On this analogy the three corresponding states of the cosmic self are described as its 'waking', 'dream' and 'sleep'. But it is nothing more than a metaphor and can only mean that sleep is *pralaya*; dream, the stage when the universe is yet in the making; and waking, when the world is fully created. It is owing to the partial character of its adjunct that the *jīva's* view of the world has the defects to which we alluded above. In the case of *Īśvara*, on the other hand, owing to the cosmic character of the adjunct, *Māyā*, they are altogether absent. The fragmentary experiences of the *jīvas* are all integrated there so that *Īśvara's* knowledge is complete as well as correct.

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* This is only one of the ways in which *Māyā* and *avidyā* are understood by Advaitins. For other views see *Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha*, pp. 66, ff.

† See p. 1, l. 16 and compare Śaṁkara on *Ch. Up.* III, xiv, 1.

Now a question arises as to the reality of this common universe. That it is dependent upon universal consciousness we know, even as the private universes, so far as they are private, are on ours. But the means of concluding to its essential independence which we found in the case of the several private universes is lacking here, for there is no second universal self by comparing with whose experience such independence may be postulated. That is, the distinction between private and public universes disappears here. From this it may seem that it is all the same which way we describe it. We may say that *Īśvara** sees the universe as it is or that it is as He sees it. But really there is an important difference, for the former may imply that the universe is independent of *Īśvara* which is against our hypothesis. So we must recognise that it is unreal in the sense that it does not exist in its own right but depends entirely upon Him both for its being and for its revelation, while He is real and self-dependent. Though only a part of the world each of us experiences is unreal, in the case of *Īśvara*, the whole world is so; and *Māyā* which gives rise to it must also be equally unreal. By unreality we do not mean absolute falsehood, for that is inconceivable since the common background, so long as it exists at all, as also its source *Māyā*, are experienced by *Īśvara*; and what is experienced cannot be unreal in the sense in which what never is, *e.g.*, 'the barren woman's son' or 'the hair on the tortoise-shell'. What is meant is only that it is not ultimately real as spirit or *caitanya* is. *Caitanya* is ineffaceable but *Māyā* is not so, nor its off-spring the world. We see now why we described the source of the universe by the name of *Māyā*. From our individual standpoint *Māyā* corresponds to the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhya; but from the standpoint of *Īśvara* or even from ours, if we *can* adopt the eventually correct attitude, it is unreal.† Since *Māyā* is instrumental in presenting an unreal world it may

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* The term is used in its wider sense so as to comprehend any of the three stages mentioned above.

† Compare *Pañca-pādikā*, p. 13 and *Pañcadaśī*, vi. 130.

also be termed, as it invariably is in our book, *ajñāna** on the analogy of our ignorance of a rope (say) which is instrumental in presenting a serpent to us. But in neither case is ignorance to be taken in the negative sense that there is no *jñāna*. It is not absence of apprehension but misapprehension; and that is the reason why it is described as 'positive' or *bhāva-rūpa* in Advaita. It not only suppresses the truth but also shows up something else in its place—results which are respectively ascribed to two powers characterising *ajñāna*, known as *āvaraṇa* ('concealment') and *vikṣepa* ('projection'). But it is essential to note that in the case of *Īśvara*, *ajñāna* operates partially—only on its *vikṣepa* side, for by hypothesis nothing is ever concealed from Him. It is true the variety of the world appears to Him, but He at the same time realizes that it is nothing more than an apparent or 'ideal' diversification within Himself. For this reason *ajñāna* or *Māyā* may also be represented as the principle of self-consciousness from His standpoint.† He takes the world as a mere projection from Himself which is not independent of Him but which to make itself manifest separates off, as it were, from Him. But as the fact of the separation itself is realised, there is no delusion for Him.

We must now determine the relation between the two elements which constitute *Īśvara* or *saguṇa-brahman*—spirit and *Māyā*. The relation must be unique, the latter being an appearance and the former, a reality. The one is ontologically lower than the other so that the relation between the two cannot be real like the relation, for instance, between a real person and an unreal serpent. It is therefore as much an appearance as the world or *Māyā*. One of the relata is altogether subordinated to

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† *Māyā* is to be regarded as standing for *Īśvara's* self-consciousness when the world of variety is thought of as the presentation. But *Māyā* itself may thus be presented, when a certain *Māyā-vṛtti* is to be understood as standing for self-consciousness. Compare the use of *mama Māyā* in *Gītā*, vii. 14.

Now a question arises as to the reality of this common universe. That it is dependent upon universal consciousness we know, even as the private universes, so far as they are private, are on ours. But the means of concluding to its essential independence which we found in the case of the several private universes is lacking here, for there is no second universal self by comparing with whose experience such independence may be postulated. That is, the distinction between private and public universes disappears here. From this it may seem that it is all the same which way we describe it. We may say that *Īśvara** sees the universe as it is or that it is as He sees it. But really there is an important difference, for the former may imply that the universe is independent of *Īśvara* which is against our hypothesis. So we must recognise that it is unreal in the sense that it does not exist in its own right but depends entirely upon Him both for its being and for its revelation, while He is real and self-dependent. Though only a part of the world each of us experiences is unreal, in the case of *Īśvara*, the whole world is so ; and *Māyā* which gives rise to it must also be equally unreal. By unreality we do not mean absolute falsehood, for that is inconceivable since the common background, so long as it exists at all, as also its source *Māyā*, are experienced by *Īśvara* ; and what is experienced cannot be unreal in the sense in which what never is, *e.g.*, 'the barren woman's son' or 'the hair on the tortoise-shell'. What is meant is only that it is not ultimately real as spirit or *caitanya* is. *Caitanya* is ineffaceable but *Māyā* is not so, nor its off-spring the world. We see now why we described the source of the universe by the name of *Māyā*. From our individual standpoint *Māyā* corresponds to the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṁkhya ; but from the standpoint of *Īśvara* or even from ours, if we *can* adopt the eventually correct attitude, it is unreal.† Since *Māyā* is instrumental in presenting an unreal world it may

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* The term is used in its wider sense so as to comprehend any of the three stages mentioned above.

† Compare *Pañca-pādikā*, p. 13 and *Pañcadaśī*, vi. 130.

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the other and the subordination is such that negating the higher negates the lower. But the reverse is not true. If the rope is denied, the serpent *is not*; but the negation of the serpent is quite conceivable with the affirmation of the rope. This is just what constitutes appearance and the rope may be described as the ground of it. Similarly in the present case, the denial of *Māyā* or the world that emerges from it does not affect spirit as that of the latter does, the former. So spirit is the ground of which *Māyā* and the world are appearances. That is, the unity belonging to the universe or its source *Māyā* and its diversity are both appearances of the ground spirit and have no being apart from it. There is thus neither duality nor unity in truth and both are equally fancied in the ultimate reality or Brahman which transcends them. This ground spirit is the *nirguṇa-brahman* of Advaita. It is compared in our book to the infinite space (to confine ourselves to one of the illustrations given there) that underlies not only the space as delimited by the individual trees or the collective forest but also those limiting adjuncts themselves. Similarly the *nirguṇa-brahman* furnishes the ultimate explanation of not only the spiritual elements in *Īśvara* and the *jīvas* but also of their limiting adjuncts, *viz.*, *Māyā* and *avidyā*. It is, in other words, the true essence of God, soul and nature. The *nirguṇa-brahman* becomes the *saguṇa* through association with *Māyā* or, utilizing one of the explanations of *Māyā* given above, when it grows self-conscious. To express the same in another way, the *nirguṇa-brahman* becomes the *saguṇa* the moment it is made the object of thought (*jñeya-brahman*). The latter is a concept but the former is Experience itself (*anubhūti*) though it is impersonal Experience. Analogically in the case of the *jīva* also, the adjuncts are wrongly superposed upon the spiritual element in it. The identity of the ground spirit in the two cases, or more strictly the non-distinction (*advaita*) between them, is the final import of the 'great sayings' like *Tat tvam asi* and constitutes the central teaching of the Upaniṣads.

The method of Advaita may be briefly described as proceeding first from diversity to unity and then from

appearance to reality. We start with the more or less diverse universes as given in our experience and discover as their common basis a single universe. Systematising the variety that is manifest in it we then arrive at unity. Lastly, since this world of unity-in-diversity cannot but be an appearance on the reasoning adopted above, we conclude from it to the spirit beyond it as the sole Reality.* The ascertainment of the true nature of the self—whether cosmic or individual—is thus finally a negative or inverted process. It is known as *śodhana* or clarifying of the conceptions of *Tat* and *tvam* or God and ego. So far reason alone is sought as the aid. The need for faith arises only at this stage when the final truth as signified by *Tat tvam asi*—that the ground of the *tvam* or the individual self is the same as the ground of *Tat* or the universal self—is to be accepted on the authority of Revelation. The Upaniṣads are accordingly divided by Advaitic teachers into three sections, two of which point out the rational method of what we have termed the clarification of the concepts of *Tat* and *tvam* and are subsidiary to the third which speaks of their identity.†

(3) The teaching thus imparted in the Upaniṣads gives rise only to mediate knowledge, as we have already observed, and is not therefore adequate to remove the belief in variety‡ which, because it is immediate, requires for its removal an equally immediate apprehension of the opposite truth of unity. To take the old example of a person mistaking a rope for a serpent in the dark, no amount of assurance by another which leads only to mediate knowledge is sufficient to bring the conviction that it is not a serpent; but a little scrutiny for himself with the aid of a lamp will do so at once. Seeing is believing. Similarly if variety is not to delude us, we must

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* It is this last stage that is described as *adhyāropāpavāda-nyāya*. See Text p. 2, ll. 23-4.

† For the exact manner in which the *mahā-vākyas* are to be understood, see Notes.

‡ The belief is primarily that *Īśvara* and *jīva* or one *jīva* and another are distinct. It is, as we know, based upon a belief in the variety of their adjuncts.

life when he wakes back to variety, though not losing sight of its underlying unity, he, as a matter of course, acts or rather cannot help acting. And whatever he does then will necessarily and of itself be right. Love will inspire his action—love arising from the discovery of his own self everywhere—not selfishness, nor even pity which also like selfishness implies the feeling of otherness which he has transcended. If, for the sake of argument, we assume that he can be inactive, he may become indifferent to what passes around him. Such a course will not taint him in the least. But that, as we have said, is only an impossible assumption. When in the end a *jīvan-mukta* is dissociated from his physical accompaniments, he becomes Brahman itself; *Brahma-vid brahmaiva bhavati.* That is known as *videha-mukti.*

श्रीः

वेदान्तसारः

अखण्डं सच्चिदानन्दमवाङ्मनसगोचरम् ।
आत्मानमखिलाधारमाश्रयेऽभीष्टसिद्धये ॥
अर्थतोऽप्यद्वयानन्दानतीतद्वैतभानतः ।
गुरूनाराध्य वेदान्तसारं वक्ष्ये यथामति ॥

वेदान्तो नामोपनिषत्प्रमाणं तदुपकारीणि शारीरकसूत्रादीनि 5
च ॥ अस्य वेदान्तप्रकरणत्वात्तदीयैरेवानुबन्धैस्तद्वत्तासिद्धेर्न ते पृथ-
गालोचनीयाः। तत्रानुबन्धो नामाधिकारिविषयसंबन्धप्रयोजनानि ॥
अधिकारी तु विधिवदधीतवेदवेदाङ्गत्वेनापाततोऽधिगताखिलवेदा-
र्थोऽस्मिन् जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा काम्यनिषिद्धवर्जनपुरस्सरं नित्य-
नैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तोपासनानुष्ठानेन निर्गतनिखिलकल्मषतया निता- 10
न्तनिर्मलस्वान्तः साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्नः प्रमाता । काम्यानि स्वर्गादी-
ष्टसाधनानि ज्योतिष्टोमादीनि । निषिद्धानि नरकाद्यनिष्टसाधनानि
ब्राह्मणहननादीनि । नित्यान्यकरणे प्रत्यवायसाधनानि संध्या-
वन्दनादीनि । नैमित्तिकानि पुत्रजन्माद्यनुबन्धीनि जातेष्ट्यादीनि ।
प्रायश्चित्तानि पापक्षयसाधनानि चान्द्रायणादीनि । उपासनानि 15
सगुणब्रह्मविषयमानसव्यापाररूपाणि शाण्डिल्यविद्यादीनि । एतेषां
नित्यादीनां बुद्धिशुद्धिः परमं प्रयोजनम्। "तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन
ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन" इत्यादिश्रुतेः "तपसा कल्मषं हन्ति"
इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च । उपासनानां तु चित्तैकाग्र्यम् । नित्यनैमित्तिकयोरु
पासनानां चावान्तरफलं पितृलोकसत्यलोकप्राप्तिः"कर्मणा पितृलोको 20
विद्यया देवलोकः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः । साधनानि नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवे-
केहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागशमादिषट्कसंपत्तिमुमुक्षुत्वानि । नित्यानि-
त्यवस्तुविवेकस्तावद्ब्रह्मैव नित्यं वस्तु ततोऽन्यदखिलमनित्यमिति

विवेचनम्। ऐहिकानां स्रक्चन्दनादिविषयभोगाणां कर्मजन्यतया-
नित्यत्ववदामुष्मिकाणामप्यमृतादिविषयभोगाणामनित्यतया तेभ्यो
नितरां विरतिरिहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः। शमादयस्तु शमदमोपरति-
तितिक्षासमाधानश्रद्धाख्याः। शमस्तावच्छ्रवणादिव्यतिरिक्तविषये-
5 भ्यो मनसो निग्रहः। दमो बाह्येन्द्रियाणां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्यो नि-
वर्तनम्। निवर्तितानामेतेषां तद्व्यतिरिक्तविषयेभ्य उपरमणमुपरतिः
अथवा विहितानां कर्मणां विधिना परित्यागः। तितिक्षा शीतोष्णा-
दिद्वन्द्वसहिष्णुता। निगृहीतस्य मनसः श्रवणादौ तदनुगुणविषये
च समाधिः समाधानम्। गुरूपदिष्टवेदान्तवाक्येषु विश्वासः श्रद्धा।
10 मुमुक्षुत्वं मोक्षेच्छा। एवंभूतः प्रमाताधिकारी "शान्तो दान्तः"
इत्यादिश्रुतेः। उक्तं च –

"प्रशान्तचित्ताय जितेन्द्रियाय च
प्रहीणदोषाय यथोक्तकारिणे।
गुणान्वितायानुगताय सर्वदा
15 प्रदेयमेतत्सततं मुमुक्षवे"॥ इति॥

विषयो जीवब्रह्मैक्यं शुद्धं चैतन्यं प्रमेयं तत्रैव वेदान्तानां तात्प-
र्यात्॥ संबन्धस्तु तदैक्यप्रमेयस्य तत्प्रतिपादकोपनिषत्प्रमाणस्य च
बोध्यबोधकभावलक्षणः॥ प्रयोजनं तदैक्यप्रमेयगताज्ञाननिवृत्तिः
स्वस्वरूपानन्दावाप्तिश्च "तरति शोकमात्मवित्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः "ब्रह्म
20 वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च॥

अयमधिकारी जननमरणादिसंसारानलसंतप्तो दीप्तशिरा जल-
राशिमिवोपहारपाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठं गुरुमुपसृत्य तमनुसरति
"समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः॥ स परमकृपयाध्या-
रोपापवादन्यायेनैनमुपदिशति "तस्मै स विद्वानुपसन्नाय प्राह"
25 इत्यादिश्रुतेः॥

असर्पभूते रज्जौ सर्पारोपवद्वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपोऽध्यारोपः। वस्तु
सच्चिदानन्दाद्वयं ब्रह्म। अज्ञानादिसकलजडसमूहोऽवस्तु। अज्ञानं तु
सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञानविरोधि भावरूपं यत्किं-
चिदिति वदन्त्यहमज्ञ इत्याद्यनुभवात् "देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगू-

ढाम्" इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च। इदमज्ञानं समष्टिव्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेणैकमनेकमिति च व्यवह्रियते। तथाहि – यथा वृक्षाणां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण वनमित्येकत्वव्यपदेशो यथा वा जलानां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण जलाशय इति तथा नानात्वेन प्रतिभासमानानां जीवगताज्ञानानां समष्ट्यभिप्रायेण तदेकत्वव्यपदेशः "अजामेकाम्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। इयं समष्टिरुत्कृष्टोपा- 5
धितया विशुद्धसत्त्वप्रधाना। एतदुपहितं चैतन्यं सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वनियन्तृत्वादिगुणकमव्यक्तमन्तर्यामी जगत्कारणमीश्वर इति च व्यपदिश्यते सकलाज्ञानावभासकत्वात् "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्" इतिश्रुतेः। ईश्वरस्येयं समष्टिरखिलकारणत्वात्कारणशरीरमानन्द-
प्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्चानन्दमयकोशः सर्वोपरमत्वात्सुषु- 10
प्तिरत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते। यथा वनस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण वृक्षा इत्यनेकत्वव्यपदेशो यथा वा जलाशयस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण जलानीति तथाज्ञानस्य व्यष्ट्यभिप्रायेण तदनेकत्वव्यपदेशः "इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। अत्र व्यस्त-
समस्तव्यापित्वेन व्यष्टिसमष्टिताव्यपदेशः। इयं व्यष्टिर्निकृष्टोपाधि- 15
तया मलिनसत्त्वप्रधाना। एतदुपहितं चैतन्यमल्पज्ञत्वानीश्वरत्वादिगुणकं प्राज्ञ इत्युच्यत एकाज्ञानावभासकत्वात्। अस्य प्राज्ञत्वमस्पष्टोपाधितयानतिप्रकाशकत्वात्। अस्यापीयमहंकारादिकारणत्वात्कारणशरीरमानन्दप्रचुरत्वात्कोशवदाच्छादकत्वाच्चानन्दमयकोशः
सर्वोपरमत्वात्सुषुप्तिरत एव स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरलयस्थानमिति 20
चोच्यते। तदानीमेतावीश्वरप्राज्ञौ चैतन्यदीप्ताभिरतिसूक्ष्माभिरज्ञानवृत्तिभिरानन्दमनुभवतः "आनन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञः" इति श्रुतेः सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किंचिदवेदिषमित्युत्थितस्य परामर्शोपपत्तेश्च। अनयोः समष्टिव्यष्ट्योर्वनवृक्षयोरिव जलाशयजलयोरिव
वाभेदः। एतदुपहितयोरीश्वरप्राज्ञयोरपि वनवृक्षावच्छिन्नाकाशयो- 25
रिव जलाशयजलगतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशयोरिव वाभेदः "एष सर्वेश्वरः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। वनवृक्षतदवच्छिन्नाकाशयोर्जलाशयजलतद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशयोर्वाधारभूतानुपहिताकाशवदनयोरज्ञानतदुपहितचैतन्ययोराधारभूतं यदनुपहितं चैतन्यं तत्तुरीयमित्युच्यते "शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यते" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। इदमेव तुरीयं शुद्धचैतन्यमज्ञाना- 30

दितदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां तप्तायःपिण्डवदविविक्तं सन्महावाक्यस्य वाच्यं विविक्तं सल्लक्ष्यमिति चोच्यते ॥

अस्याज्ञानस्यावरणविक्षेपनामकमस्ति शक्तिद्वयम्। आवरणशक्तिस्तावदल्पोऽपि मेघोऽनेकयोजनायतमादित्यमण्डलमवलोक-
5 यितृनयनपथपिधायकतया यथाच्छादयतीव तथाज्ञानं परिच्छिन्नमप्यात्मानमपरिच्छिन्नमसंसारिणमवलोकयितृबुद्धिपिधायकतया-च्छादयतीव। तादृशं सामर्थ्यम्। तदुक्तम्—

"घनच्छन्नदृष्टिर्घनच्छन्नमर्कं
यथा निष्प्रभं मन्यते चातिमूढः।
10 तथा बद्धवद्भाति यो मूढदृष्टेः
स नित्योपलब्धिस्वरूपोऽहमात्मा॥" इति।

always of the nature of experience

अनयैवावरणशक्त्यावच्छिन्नस्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखदुःखमोहात्मकतुच्छसंसारभावनापि संभाव्यते यथा स्वाज्ञानेनावृतायां रज्ज्वां सर्पत्वसंभावना। विक्षेपशक्तिस्तु यथा रज्ज्वज्ञानं स्वावृत-
15 रज्जौ स्वशक्त्या सर्पादिकमुद्भावयत्येवमज्ञानमपि स्वावृतात्मनि विक्षेपशक्त्याकाशादिप्रपञ्चमुद्भावयति। तादृशं सामर्थ्यम्। तदुक्तम्-

Diversifying power.

"विक्षेपशक्तिर्लिङ्गादि ब्रह्माण्डान्तं जगत्सृजेत्॥" इति। शक्तिद्वयवदज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यं स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं स्वोपाधिप्रधानतयोपादानं च भवति। यथा लूता तन्तुकार्यं प्रति स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं
20 स्वशरीरप्रधानतयोपादानं च भवति। तमःप्रधानविक्षेपशक्तिमदज्ञानोपहितचैतन्यादाकाश आकाशाद्वायुर्वायोरग्निरग्नेरापोऽद्भ्यः पृथिवी चोत्पद्यते "एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। तेषु जाड्याधिक्यदर्शनात्तमःप्राधान्यं तत्कारणस्य। तदानीं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि कारणगुणप्रक्रमेण तेष्वाकाशादिषूत्पद्यन्ते। एतान्येव
25 सूक्ष्मभूतानि तन्मात्राण्यपञ्चीकृतानि चोच्यन्ते। एतेभ्यः सूक्ष्मशरीराणि स्थूलभूतानि चोत्पद्यन्ते॥

आकाशादीनि

सूक्ष्मशरीराणि सप्तदशावयवानि लिङ्गशरीराणि। अवयवास्तु ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं बुद्धिमनसी कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकं वायुपञ्चकं चेति। ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणाख्यानि। एतान्याकाशादीनां
30 सात्त्विकांशेभ्यो व्यस्तेभ्यः पृथक् पृथक् क्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते। बुद्धिर्नाम

निश्चयात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिः। मनो नाम संकल्पविकल्पात्मिकान्तःकरणवृत्तिः। अनयोरेव चित्ताहंकारयोरन्तर्भावः। एते पुनराकाशादिगतसात्त्विकांशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते। एतेषां प्रकाशात्मकत्वात्सात्त्विकांशकार्यत्वम्। इयं बुद्धिर्ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सहिता विज्ञानमयकोशो भवति। अयं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखित्वदुःखित्वाद्यभिमानित्वेने- 5 हलोकपरलोकगामी व्यावहारिको जीव इत्युच्यते। मनस्तु ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सहितं सन्मनोमयकोशो भवति। कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाख्यानि। एतानि पुनराकाशादीनां रजोंशेभ्यो व्यस्तेभ्यः पृथक् पृथक् क्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते। वायवः प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानाः। प्राणो नाम प्राग्गमनवान्नासाग्रस्थानवर्ती। अपानो नामावाग्गमन- 10 वान्पाय्वादिस्थानवर्ती। व्यानो नाम विष्वग्गमनवानखिलशरीरवर्ती। उदानो नाम कण्ठस्थानीय ऊर्ध्वगमनवानुत्क्रमणवायुः। समानो नाम शरीरमध्यगोऽशितपीतान्नादिसमीकरणकरः। केचित्तु नागकूर्मकृकलदेवदत्तधनंजयाख्याः पञ्चान्ये वायवः सन्तीति वदन्ति। तत्र नाग उद्गिरणकरः। कूर्म उन्मीलनकरः। कृकलः क्षुत्करः। देवदत्तो 15 जृम्भणकरः। धनंजयः पोषणकरः। एतेषां प्राणादिष्वन्तर्भावात्प्राणादयः पञ्चैवेति केचित्। एतत्प्राणादिपञ्चकमाकाशादिगतरजोंशेभ्यो मिलितेभ्य उत्पद्यते। इदं प्राणादिपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रियैः सहितं सत्प्राणमयकोशो भवति। अस्य क्रियात्मकत्वेन रजोंशकार्यत्वम्। एतेषु कोशेषु मध्ये विज्ञानमयो ज्ञानशक्तिमान् कर्तृरूपः। मनोमय 20 इच्छाशक्तिमान् करणरूपः। प्राणमयः क्रियाशक्तिमान् कार्यरूपः। योग्यत्वादेवमेतेषां विभाग इति वर्णयन्ति। एतत्कोशत्रयं मिलितं सत्सूक्ष्मशरीरमित्युच्यते॥

अत्राप्यखिलसूक्ष्मशरीरमेकबुद्धिविषयतया वनवज्जलाशयवद्वा समष्टिरनेकबुद्धिविषयतया वृक्षवज्जलवद्वा व्यष्टिरपि भवति। 25 एतत्समष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं सूत्रात्मा हिरण्यगर्भः प्राण इति चोच्यते सर्वानुस्यूतत्वाज्ज्ञानेच्छाक्रियाशक्तिमदुपहितत्वाच्च। अस्यैषा समष्टिः स्थूलप्रपञ्चापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वात्सूक्ष्मशरीरं विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं जाग्रद्वासनामयत्वात्स्वप्नोऽत एव स्थूलप्रपञ्चलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते। एतद्व्यष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं तैजसो भवति तेजोमयान्तः- 30

fancying itself

empirical

of the nature of action

करणोपहितत्वात् । अस्यापीयं व्यष्टिः स्थूलशरीरापेक्षया सूक्ष्मत्वादिति हेतोरेव सूक्ष्मशरीरं विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं जाग्रद्वासनामयत्वात्स्वप्नोऽत एव स्थूलशरीरलयस्थानमिति चोच्यते । एतौ सूत्रात्मतैजसौ तदानीं मनोवृत्तिभिः सूक्ष्मविषयाननुभवतः "प्रवि-
5 विक्तभुक्तैजसः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः । अत्रापि समष्टिव्यष्ट्योस्तदुपहितसूत्रात्मतैजसयोर्वनवृक्षवत्तदवच्छिन्नाकाशवच्च जलाशयजलवत्तद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्चाभेदः । एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरोत्पत्तिः ॥

स्थूलभूतानि तु पञ्चीकृतानि । पञ्चीकरणं त्वाकाशादिषु पञ्चस्वेकैकं द्विधा समं विभज्य तेषु दशसु भागेषु प्राथमिकान्पञ्च भागा-
10 न्प्रत्येकं चतुर्धा समं विभज्य तेषां चतुर्णां भागानां स्वस्वद्वितीयार्धभागपरित्यागेन भागान्तरेषु योजनम् । तदुक्तम् –

"द्विधा विधाय चैकैकं चतुर्धा प्रथमं पुनः ।
स्वस्वेतरद्वितीयांशैर्योजनात्पञ्च पञ्च ते" ॥ इति ।

अस्याप्रामाण्यं नाशङ्कनीयं त्रिवृत्करणश्रुतेः पञ्चीकरणस्याप्यु-
15 पलक्षणत्वात् । पञ्चानां पञ्चात्मकत्वे समानेऽपि "वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः" इतिन्यायेनाकाशादिव्यपदेशः संभवति । तदानीमाकाशे शब्दोऽभिव्यज्यते वायौ शब्दस्पर्शावग्नौ शब्दस्पर्शरूपाण्यप्सु शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः पृथिव्यां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाश्च ॥ एतेभ्यः पञ्चीकृतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो भूर्भुवस्स्वर्महर्जनस्तपस्सत्यमित्येतन्नामका-
20 नामुपर्युपरिविद्यमानानामतलवितलसुतलरसातलतलातलमहातलपातालनामकानामधोऽधोविद्यमानानां लोकानां ब्रह्माण्डस्य तदन्तर्वर्तिचतुर्विधस्थूलशरीराणां तदुचितानामन्नपानादीनां चोत्पत्तिर्भवति । चतुर्विधशरीराणि तु जरायुजाण्डजोद्भिज्जस्वेदजाख्यानि । जरायुजानि जरायुभ्यो जातानि मनुष्यपश्वादीनि । अण्डजान्यण्डे-
25 भ्यो जातानि पक्षिपन्नगादीनि । उद्भिज्जानि भूमिमुद्भिद्य जातानि कक्षवृक्षादीनि । स्वेदजानि स्वेदाज्जातानि यूकामशकादीनि ॥

अत्रापि चतुर्विधसकलस्थूलशरीरमेकानेकबुद्धिविषयतया वनवज्जलाशयवद्वा समष्टिर्वृक्षवज्जलवद्वा व्यष्टिरपि भवति । एतत्समष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं वैश्वानरो विराडिति चोच्यते सर्वनराभिमानित्वा-
30 द्विविधं राजमानत्वाच्च । अस्यैषा समष्टिः स्थूलशरीरमन्नविका-

रत्वादन्नमयकोशः स्थूलभोगायतनत्वाच्च स्थूलशरीरं जाग्रदिति च व्यपदिश्यते। एतव्द्यष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यं विश्व इत्युच्यते सूक्ष्मशरीराभिमानमपरित्यज्य स्थूलशरीरादिप्रविष्टत्वात्। अस्याप्येषा व्यष्टिः स्थूलशरीरमन्नविकारत्वादेव हेतोरन्नमयकोशो जाग्रदिति चोच्यते। तदानीमेतौ विश्ववैश्वानरौ दिग्वातार्कवरुणाश्विभिः क्रमा- 5 न्नियन्त्रितेन श्रोत्रादीन्द्रियपञ्चकेन क्रमाच्छब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानग्नीन्द्रोपेन्द्रयमप्रजापतिभिः क्रमान्नियन्त्रितेन वागादीन्द्रियपञ्चकेन क्रमाद्वचनादानगमनविसर्गानन्दांश्चन्द्रचतुर्मुखशंकराच्युतैः क्रमान्नियन्त्रितेन मनोबुद्ध्यहंकारचित्ताख्येनान्तरिन्द्रियचतुष्केण क्रमात्संकल्पनिश्चयाहंकार्यचैत्तांश्च सर्वानेतान् स्थूलविषयाननुभवतः "जाग- 10 रितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। अत्राप्यनयोः स्थूलव्यष्टिसमष्ट्योस्तदुपहितविश्ववैश्वानरयोश्च वृक्षवनवत्तदवच्छिन्नाकाशवच्च जलजलाशयवत्तद्गतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्च पूर्ववदभेदः। एवं पञ्चीकृतपञ्चभूतेभ्यः स्थूलप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तिः॥

एतेषां स्थूलसूक्ष्मकारणप्रपञ्चानामपि समष्टिरेको महान्प्रपञ्चो 15 भवति यथावान्तरवनानां समष्टिरेकं महद्वनं भवति यथा वावान्तरजलाशयानां समष्टिरेको महान् जलाशयः। एतदुपहितं वैश्वानरादीश्वरपर्यन्तं चैतन्यमप्यवान्तरवनावच्छिन्नाकाशवदवान्तरजलाशयगतप्रतिबिम्बाकाशवच्चैकमेव। आभ्यां महाप्रपञ्चतदुपहितचैतन्याभ्यां तप्तायःपिण्डवदविविक्तं सदनुपहितं चैतन्यं "सर्वं खल्विदं 20 ब्रह्म" इति वाक्यस्य वाच्यं भवति विविक्तं सल्लक्ष्यमपि भवति। एवं वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपोऽध्यारोपः सामान्येन प्रदर्शितः॥

इदानीं प्रत्यगात्मनीदमिदमयमयमारोपयतीति विशेषत उच्यते। अतिप्राकृतस्तु "आत्मा वै जायते पुत्रः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः स्वस्मिन्निव स्वपुत्रेऽपि प्रेमदर्शनात्पुत्रे पुष्टे नष्टे चाहमेव पुष्टो नष्टश्चे- 25 त्याद्यनुभवाच्च पुत्र आत्मेति वदति। चार्वाकस्तु "स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः प्रदीप्तगृहात्स्वपुत्रं परित्यज्यापि स्वस्य निर्गमदर्शनात्स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्याद्यनुभवाच्च स्थूलशरीरमात्मेति वदति। अपरश्चार्वाकः "ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः" इत्यादिश्रुतेरिन्द्रियाणामभावे शरीरचलनाभावात्काणोऽहं 30

बधिरोऽहमित्याद्यनुभवाच्चेन्द्रियाण्यात्मेति वदति। अपरश्चार्वाकः "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः प्राणाभाव इन्द्रियादिचलनायोगादहमशनायावानहं पिपासावानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च प्राण आत्मेति वदति। अन्यस्तु चार्वाकः "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः"
5 इत्यादिश्रुतेर्मनसि सुप्ते प्राणादेरभावादहं संकल्पवानहं विकल्पवानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च मन आत्मेति वदति। बौद्धस्तु "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः कर्तुरभावे करणस्य शक्त्यभावादहं कर्ताहं भोक्तेत्याद्यनुभवाच्च बुद्धिरात्मेति वदति। प्राभाकरतार्किकौ तु "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः" इत्यादिश्रुतेर्बुद्ध्यादी-
10 नामज्ञाने लयदर्शनादहमज्ञोऽहं ज्ञानीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानमात्मेति वदतः। भाट्टस्तु "प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः सुषुप्तौ प्रकाशाप्रकाशसद्भावान्मामहं न जानामीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्मेति वदति। अपरो बौद्धः "असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः सुषुप्तौ सर्वाभावादहं सुषुप्तौ नासमित्युत्थितस्य स्वाभाव-
15 परामर्शविषयानुभवाच्च शून्यमात्मेति वदति॥

एतेषां पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वमुच्यते। एतैरतिप्राकृतादिवादिभिरुक्तेषु श्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासेषु पूर्वपूर्वोक्तश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासानामुत्तरोत्तरश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासैर्बाधदर्शनात्पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वं स्पष्टमेव। किञ्च 'प्रत्यक्' 'अस्थूलः' 'अचक्षुः' 'अप्राणः' 'अमनाः'
20 'अकर्ता' 'चैतन्यम्' 'चिन्मात्रम्' 'सत्' इत्यादिप्रबलश्रुतिविरोधादस्य पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तस्य जडस्य चैतन्यभास्यत्वेन घटादिवदनित्यत्वादहं ब्रह्मेति विद्वदनुभवप्राबल्याच्च तत्तच्छ्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासानां बाधितत्वादपि पुत्रादिशून्यपर्यन्तमखिलमनात्मैव। अतस्तत्तद्भासकं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावं प्रत्यक्चैतन्यमेवात्मव-
25 स्त्विति वेदान्तविदनुभवः। एवमध्यारोपः॥

अपवादो नाम रज्जुविवर्तस्य सर्पस्य रज्जुमात्रत्ववद्वस्तुविवर्तस्यावस्तुनोऽज्ञानादेः प्रपञ्चस्य वस्तुमात्रत्वम्। तदुक्तम्।

"सतत्त्वतोऽन्यथाप्रथा विकार इत्युदीरितः।
अतत्त्वतोऽन्यथाप्रथा विवर्त इत्युदाहृत" इति॥

30 तथाहि – एतद्भोगायतनं चतुर्विधसकलस्थूलशरीरजातं भो-

ग्यरूपान्नपानादिकमेतदायतनभूतभूरादिचतुर्दशभुवनान्येतदायतन-
भूतं ब्रह्माण्डं चैतत्सर्वमेतेषां कारणरूपपञ्चीकृतभूतमात्रं भवति।
एतानि शब्दादिविषयसहितानि पञ्चीकृतानि भूतानि सूक्ष्मशरीर-
जातं चैतत्सर्वमेतेषां कारणरूपापञ्चीकृतभूतमात्रं भवति। एतानि
सत्त्वादिगुणसहितान्यपञ्चीकृतान्युत्पत्तिव्युत्क्रमेणैतत्कारणभूताज्ञा- 5
नोपहितचैतन्यमात्रं भवति। एतदज्ञानमज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यं चेश्वरा-
दिकमेतदाधारभूतानुपहितचैतन्यरूपं तुरीयं ब्रह्ममात्रं भवति॥

आभ्यामध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां तत्त्वंपदार्थशोधनमपि सिद्धं
भवति। तथाहि — अज्ञानादिसमष्टिरेतदुपहितं सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टं
चैतन्यमेतदनुपहितं चैतन्त्रयं तप्तायःपिण्डवदेकत्वेनावभासमानं 10
तत्पदवाच्यार्थो भवति। एतदुपाध्युपहिताधारभूतमनुपहितं चैतन्यं
तत्पदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति। अज्ञानादिव्यष्टिरेतदुपहितालपज्ञत्वादिविशि-
ष्टचैतन्यमेतदनुपहितं चैतन्त्रयं तप्तायःपिण्डवदेकत्वेनावभासमानं
त्वंपदवाच्यार्थो भवति। एतदुपाध्युपहिताधारभूतमनुपहितं प्रत्य-
गानन्दं तुरीयं चैतन्यं त्वंपदलक्ष्यार्थो भवति॥ 15

अथ महावाक्यार्थो वर्ण्यते। इदं 'तत्त्वमसि'वाक्यं संबन्धत्रये-
णाखण्डार्थबोधकं भवति। संबन्धत्रयं नाम पदयोः सामानाधिक-
रण्यं पदार्थयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावः प्रत्यगात्मपदार्थयोर्लक्ष्यलक्षण-
भावश्चेति। तदुक्तम् —

"सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता। 20
लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम्"॥ इति।

सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धस्तावद्यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यस्मिन्वाक्ये
तत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तवाचकसशब्दस्यैतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तवाच—
कायंशब्दस्य चैकस्मिन्पिण्डे तात्पर्यसंबन्धः। तथात्र 'तत्त्वमसि' इति
वाक्येऽपि परोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यवाचकतत्पदस्यापरोक्षत्वादि— 25
विशिष्टचैतन्यवाचकत्वंपदस्य चैकस्मिंश्चैतन्ये तात्पर्यसंबन्धः। विशे-
षणविशेष्यभावसंबन्धस्तु यथा तत्रैव वाक्ये सशब्दार्थतत्कालविशि-
ष्टदेवदत्तस्यायंशब्दार्थैतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तस्य चान्योऽन्यभेदव्याव-
र्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्यभावः। तथात्रापि वाक्ये तत्पदार्थपरोक्षत्वा-
दिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य त्वंपदार्थापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य चान्योऽ- 30

न्यभेदव्यावर्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्यभावः । लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धस्तु यथा तत्रैव सशब्दायंशब्दयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा विरुद्धतत्कालैतत्कालविशिष्टत्वपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धदेवदत्तेन सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः । तथात्रापि वाक्ये तत्त्वंपदयोस्तदर्थयोर्वा विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशि-
5 ष्टत्वपरित्यागेनाविरुद्धचैतन्येन सह लक्ष्यलक्षणभावः। इयमेव भागलक्षणेत्युच्यते ॥ अस्मिन्वाक्ये 'नीलमुत्पलम्' इति वाक्यवद्वाक्यार्थो न संगच्छते । तत्र तु नीलपदार्थनीलगुणस्योत्पलपदार्थोत्पलद्रव्यस्य च शौक्ल्यपटादिव्यावर्तकतयान्योऽन्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावसंसर्गस्यान्यतरविशिष्टस्यान्यतरस्य तदैक्यस्य वा वाक्यार्थत्वा-
10 ङ्गीकारे प्रमाणान्तरविरोधाभावात्तद्वाक्यार्थः संगच्छते। अत्र तु तदर्थपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य त्वमर्थापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यस्य चान्योऽन्यभेदव्यावर्तकतया विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंसर्गस्यान्यतरविशिष्टस्यान्यतरस्य तदैक्यस्य वा वाक्यार्थत्वाङ्गीकारे प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधाद्वाक्यार्थो न संगच्छते । तदुक्तम् –

15 "संसर्गो वा विशिष्टो वा वाक्यार्थो नात्र संमतः।
अखण्डैकरसत्वेन वाक्यार्थो विदुषां मतः" ॥ इति ॥

अत्र 'गङ्गायां घोषः प्रतिवसति' इतिवाक्यवज्जहल्लक्षणापि न संगच्छते । तत्र तु गङ्गाघोषयोराधाराधेयभावलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्याशेषतो विरुद्धत्वाद्वाक्यार्थमशेषतः परित्यज्य तत्संबन्धितीरलक्षणाया
20 युक्तत्वाज्जहल्लक्षणा संगच्छते । अत्र तु परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्य भागमात्रे विरोधाद्भागान्तरमपि परित्यज्यान्यलक्षणाया अयुक्तत्वाज्जहल्लक्षणा न संगच्छते । न च गङ्गापदं स्वार्थपरित्यागेन तीरपदार्थं यथा लक्षयति तथा तत्पदं त्वंपदं वा स्वार्थपरित्यागेन त्वंपदार्थं तत्पदार्थं वा लक्षयत्वतः कुतो
25 जहल्लक्षणा न संगच्छत इति वाच्यम् । तत्र तीरपदाश्रवणेन तदर्थाप्रतीतौ लक्षणया तत्प्रतीत्यपेक्षायामपि तत्त्वंपदयोः श्रूयमाणत्वेन तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणया पुनरन्यतरपदेनान्यतरपदार्थप्रतीत्यपेक्षाभावात् ॥ अत्र 'शोणो धावति' इतिवाक्यवदजहल्लक्षणापि न संभवति। तत्र शोणगुणगमनलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्तदपरित्यागेन तदा-
30 श्रयाश्वादिलक्षणया तद्विरोधपरिहारसंभवादजहल्लक्षणा संभवति ।

अत्र तु परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्य विरुद्धत्वात्तदपरित्यागेन तत्संबन्धिनो यस्य कस्यचिदर्थस्य लक्षितत्वेऽपि तद्विरोधपरिहारासंभवादजहल्लक्षणा न संभवत्येव। न च तत्पदं त्वंपदं वा स्वार्थविरुद्धांशपरित्यागेनांशान्तरसहितं त्वंपदार्थं तत्पदार्थं वा लक्षयत्वतः कथं प्रकारान्तरेण भागलक्षणाङ्गीकरणमि- 5
ति वाच्यम्। एकेन पदेन स्वार्थांशपदार्थान्तरोभयलक्षणाया असंभवात्पदान्तरेण तदर्थप्रतीतौ लक्षणया पुनस्तत्प्रतीत्यपेक्षाभावाच्च॥ तस्माद्यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इति वाक्यं तदर्थो वा तत्कालैतत्कालविशिष्टदेवदत्तलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्यांशे विरोधाद्विरुद्धतत्कालैतत्कालविशिष्टत्वांशं परित्यज्याविरुद्धं देवदत्तांशमात्रं लक्षयति 10
तथा 'तत्त्वमसि' इतिवाक्यं तदर्थो वा परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्यैकत्वलक्षणस्य वाक्यार्थस्यांशे विरोधाद्विरुद्धपरोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टत्वांशं परित्यज्याविरुद्धमखण्डचैतन्यमात्रं लक्षयतीति॥

अथाधुना 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' इत्यनुभववाक्यार्थो वर्ण्यते। एवमाचार्येणाध्यारोपापवादपुरस्सरं तत्त्वंपदार्थौ शोधयित्वा वाक्ये- 15
नाखण्डार्थेऽवबोधितेऽधिकारिणोऽहं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावपरमानन्दानन्ताद्वयं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यखण्डाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिरुदेति। सा तु चित्प्रतिबिम्बसहिता सती प्रत्यगभिन्नमज्ञातं परं ब्रह्म विषयीकृत्य तद्गताज्ञानमेव बाधते। तदा पटकारणतन्तुदाहे पटदाहवदखिलकार्यकारणेऽज्ञाने बाधिते सति तत्कार्यस्याखिलस्य 20
बाधितत्वात्तदन्तर्भूताखण्डाकाराकारिता चित्तवृत्तिरपि बाधिता भवति। तत्र प्रतिबिम्बितं चैतन्यमपि यथा दीपप्रभादित्यप्रभावभासनासमर्था सती तयाभिभूता भवति तथा स्वयंप्रकाशमानप्रत्यगभिन्नपरब्रह्मावभासनानर्हतया तेनाभिभूतं सत्स्वोपाधिभूताखण्डवृत्तेर्बाधितत्वाद्दर्पणाभावे मुखप्रतिबिम्बस्य मुखमात्रत्ववत्प्रत्य- 25
गभिन्नपरब्रह्ममात्रं भवति॥ एवं च सति "मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्" "यन्मनसा न मनुते" इत्यनयोः श्रुत्योरविरोधो वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वाङ्गीकारेण फलव्याप्यत्वप्रतिषेधप्रतिपादनात्। तदुक्तम् — "फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शास्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम्॥" "ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय वृत्तिव्याप्तिरपेक्षिता" इति॥ "स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वान्नाभास उपयुज्यते" 30

इति च ॥ जडपदार्थाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तेर्विशेषोऽस्ति । तथाहि-अयं घट इति घटाकाराकारितचित्तवृत्तिरज्ञातं घटं विषयीकृत्य तद्गताज्ञाननिरसनपुरस्सरं स्वगतचिदाभासेन जडं घटमपि भासयति । तदुक्तम् –

5 "बुद्धितत्स्थचिदाभासौ द्वावपि व्याप्नुतो घटम् ।
तत्राज्ञानं धिया नश्येदाभासेन घटः स्फुरेत्" ॥ इति ।

यथा दीपप्रभामण्डलमन्धकारगतं घटपटादिकं विषयीकृत्य तद्गतान्धकारनिरसनपुरस्सरं स्वप्रभया तदपि भासयतीति ॥

एवंभूतस्वस्वरूपचैतन्यसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं श्रवणमनननिदिध्या-10 सनसमाध्यनुष्ठानस्यापेक्षितत्वात्तेऽपि प्रदर्श्यन्ते । श्रवणं नाम षड्विधलिङ्गैरशेषवेदान्तानामद्वितीयवस्तुनि तात्पर्यावधारणम् । लिङ्गानि तूपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यासापूर्वताफलार्थवादोपपत्त्याख्यानि । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्यार्थस्य तदाद्यन्तयोरुपपादनमुपक्रमोपसंहारौ । यथा छान्दोग्ये षष्ठाध्याये प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनः "एकमेवाद्विती-15 यम्" इत्यादौ "ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्" इत्यन्ते च प्रतिपादनम् । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य वस्तुनस्तन्मध्ये पौनःपुन्येन प्रतिपादनमभ्यासः। यथा तत्रैवाद्वितीयवस्तुनो मध्ये 'तत्त्वमसि' इति नवकृत्वः प्रतिपादनम् । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्याद्वितीयवस्तुनः प्रमाणान्तराविषयीकरणमपूर्वता । यथा तत्रैवाद्वितीयवस्तुनो मानान्तराविषयीकरणम् । फलं तु 20 प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्यात्मज्ञानस्य तदनुष्ठानस्य वा तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणं प्रयोजनम् । यथा तत्र "आचार्यवान्पुरुषो वेद तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये" इत्यद्वितीयवस्तुज्ञानस्य तत्प्राप्तिः प्रयोजनं श्रूयते । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यस्य तत्र तत्र प्रशंसनमर्थवादः । यथा तत्रैव "उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतम-25 विज्ञातं विज्ञातम्" इत्यद्वितीयवस्तुप्रशंसनम् । प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यार्थसाधने तत्र तत्र श्रूयमाणा युक्तिरुपपत्तिः । यथा तत्र "यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" इत्यादावद्वितीयवस्तुसाधने विकारस्य वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वे युक्तिः श्रूयते ॥ मननं तु श्रुतस्याद्वितीयवस्तुनो

वेदान्तानुगुणयुक्तिभिरनवरतमनुचिन्तनम् ॥ विजातीयदेहादिप्रत्य-
यरहिताद्वितीयवस्तुसजातीयप्रत्ययप्रवाहो निदिध्यासनम् ॥ समा-
धिर्द्विविधः सविकल्पको निर्विकल्पकश्चेति । तत्र सविकल्पको नाम
ज्ञातृज्ञानादिविकल्पलयानपेक्षयाद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदाकाराकारिता-
याश्चित्तवृत्तेरवस्थानम् । तदा मृन्मयगजादिभानेऽपि मृद्भानवद्द्वैत- 5
भानेऽप्यद्वैतं वस्तु भासते । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः —

"दृशिस्वरूपं गगनोपमं परं
सकृद्विभातं त्वजमेकमक्षरम् ।
अलेपकं सर्वगतं यदद्वयं
तदेव चाहं सततं विमुक्त ओम्" ॥ इति । 10

निर्विकल्पकस्तु ज्ञातृज्ञानादिविकल्पलयापेक्षयाद्वितीयवस्तुनि तदा-
काराकारितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेरतितरामेकीभावेनावस्थानम् । तदा तु
जलाकाराकारितलवणानवभासेन जलमात्रावभासवदद्वितीयवस्त्वा-
काराकारितचित्तवृत्त्यनवभासेनाद्वितीयवस्तुमात्रमवभासते । तत-
श्चास्य सुषुप्तेश्चाभेदशङ्का न भवति । उभयत्र वृत्त्यभाने समानेऽपि 15
तत्सद्भावासद्भावमात्रेणानयोर्भेदोपपत्तेः । अस्याङ्गानि यमनियमा-
सनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयः । तत्र "अहिंसासत्या-
स्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः" । "शौचसंतोषतपस्स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्र-
णिधानानि नियमाः" । करचरणादिसंस्थानविशेषलक्षणानि पद्म-
स्वस्तिकादीन्यासनानि । रेचकपूरककुम्भकलक्षणाः प्राणनिग्रहो- 20
पायाः प्राणायामाः । इन्द्रियाणां स्वस्वविषयेभ्यः प्रत्याहरणं प्रत्या-
हारः । अद्वितीयवस्तुन्यन्तरिन्द्रियधारणं धारणा । तत्राद्वितीय-
वस्तुनि विच्छिद्य विच्छिद्यान्तरिन्द्रियवृत्तिप्रवाहो ध्यानम् । समा-
धिस्तूक्तः सविकल्पक एव । अस्याङ्गिनो निर्विकल्पकस्य लयवि-
क्षेपकषायरसास्वादलक्षणाश्चत्वारो विघ्नाः संभवन्ति । लयस्ताव- 25
दखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन चित्तवृत्तेर्निद्रा । अखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेन
चित्तवृत्तेरन्यावलम्बनं विक्षेपः । लयविक्षेपाभावेऽपि चित्तवृत्ते
रागादिवासनया स्तब्धीभावादखण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनं कषायः । अख-
ण्डवस्त्वनवलम्बनेऽपि चित्तवृत्तेः सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनं रसा-
स्वादः । समाध्यारम्भसमये सविकल्पकानन्दास्वादनं वा । अनेन 30

विघ्नचतुष्टयेन विरहितं चित्तं निवातदीपवदचलं सदखण्डचैतन्यमात्रमवतिष्ठते यदा तदा निर्विकल्पकः समाधिरित्युच्यते। तदुक्तम्—

"लये संबोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिप्तं शमयेत्पुनः।
सकषायं विजानीयाच्छमप्राप्तं न चालयेत्।
5 नास्वादयेद्रसं तत्र निस्सङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत्॥" इति प्रज्ञया युक्त इत्यर्थः
"यथा दीपो निवातस्थो नेङ्गते सोपमा स्मृता॥" इति च॥

अथ जीवन्मुक्तलक्षणमुच्यते। जीवन्मुक्तो नाम स्वस्वरूपाखण्डब्रह्मज्ञानेन तदज्ञानबाधनद्वारा स्वस्वरूपाखण्डब्रह्मणि साक्षात्कृतेऽज्ञानतत्कार्यसंचितकर्मसंशयविपर्ययादीनामपि बाधितत्वादखि-
10 लबन्धरहितो ब्रह्मनिष्ठः।

"भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे"॥

इत्यादिश्रुतेः। अयं तु व्युत्थानसमये मांसशोणितमूत्रपुरीषादिभाजनेन शरीरेणान्ध्यमान्द्यापटुत्वादिभाजनेनेन्द्रियग्रामेणाशनायापिपा-
15 साशोकमोहादिभाजनेनान्तःकरणेन च पूर्वपूर्ववासनया क्रियमाणानि कर्माणि भुज्यमानानि ज्ञानाविरुद्धारब्धफलानि च पश्यन्नपि बाधितत्वात्परमार्थतो न पश्यति। यथेन्द्रजालमिदमिति ज्ञानवांस्तदिन्द्रजालं पश्यन्नपि परमार्थमिदमिति न पश्यति। "सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। उक्तं च—

20 "सुषुप्तवज्जाग्रति यो न पश्यति
द्वयं च पश्यन्नपि चाद्वयत्वतः।
तथा च कुर्वन्नपि निष्क्रियश्च यः
स आत्मविन्नान्य इतीह निश्चयः"॥ इति।

अस्य ज्ञानात्पूर्वं विद्यमानानामेवाहारविहारादीनामनुवृत्तिवच्छुभ-
25 वासनानामेवानुवृत्तिर्भवति शुभाशुभयोरौदासीन्यं वा। तदुक्तम्—

"बुद्धाद्वैतसतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं यदि।
शुनां तत्त्वदृशां चैव को भेदोऽशुचिभक्षणे"॥ इति।
"ब्रह्मवित्त्वं तथा मुक्त्वा स आत्मज्ञो न चेतरः"॥ इति च। तदानी-

ममानित्वादीनि ज्ञानसाधनान्यद्वेष्टृत्वादयः सद्गुणाश्चालंकारवदनु-
वर्तन्ते । तदुक्तम् —

"उत्पन्नात्मावबोधस्य ह्यद्वेष्टृत्वादयो गुणाः ।
अयत्नतो भवन्त्यस्य न तु साधनरूपिणः" ॥ इति ॥

किं बहुना । अयं देहयात्रामात्रार्थमिच्छानिच्छापरेच्छाप्रापितानि 5
सुखदुःखलक्षणान्यारब्धफलान्यनुभवन्नन्तःकरणाभासादीनामवभा-
सकः संस्तदवसाने प्रत्यगानन्दपरब्रह्मणि प्राणे लीने सत्यज्ञानत-
त्कार्यसंस्काराणामपि विनाशात्परमकैवल्यमानन्दैकरसमखिलभेदप्र-
तिभासरहितमखण्डं ब्रह्मावतिष्ठते । "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति"
"अत्रैव समवनीयन्ते" "विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ॥ 10

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यसदानन्दविरचितो
वेदान्तसारः समाप्तः ॥

VEDANTA-SARA

Notes

N. B.—Very little is known about the author, सदानन्द.[1] The सुबोधिनी, which is one of the commentaries on the work, is dated 1588 A.D.[2] and if the terms in which it refers to सदानन्द[3] signify that he was the preceptor's preceptor of the commentator नृसिंहसरस्वती, our author may be taken to have lived in the early part of that century. The chief sources from which information is drawn for the work are the माण्डूक्योपनिषद् and the पञ्चदशी of विद्यारण्य. The important portion dealing with what is termed अध्यारोप (pp. 2–7), for instance, is based upon the former and the account of the different conceptions of the जीव (pp.7–8) on the पञ्चदशी[4]. The style is clear and quite matter of–fact. As a general introduction to the Advaita philosophy, the work is very good; and it has for long served as such, particularly for students of the subject in Indian as well as foreign universities. It has often been printed and has also been translated into more than one European language. Three commentaries upon it have so far been published, to one of which we have already referred. Of the remaining two, the बालबोधिनी by आपदेव[5] is the more learned, but it sometimes strains the text to get out of it what it conceives to be the teaching of Advaita; the other, the विद्वन्मनोरञ्जनी by रामतीर्थ[6] is simpler and more helpful to the beginner. It is now usual to say that the वेदान्त as re-

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1. सदानन्द, the author of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, is different. It may also be noted that the वेदान्तसार printed along with the वेदान्तपरिभाषा at Madras[7] (1892) is by one शिवरामभट्टाचार्य.

2. See Nirnaya Sagara Ed. p. 59. This is referred to hereafter as S.

3. *Ibid* p. 56.

4. Chapter vi.So far as the पञ्चदशी is concerned,there are also points of divergence. Compare *e. g.* the differentiation between माया and अविद्या(I. 16) which are identified in the वेदान्तसार

5. Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam. This is referred to hereafter as B.

6. Nirnaya-Sagara Press. This is referred to hereafter as VM.

presented here shows much contamination with the सांख्य [7]. The relation between the वेदान्त and the सांख्य is a much discussed question in the history of Indian philosophy. Without entering into the details of it, we may merely observe that the kinship between them is far older than it is commonly taken to be and can be clearly traced in more than one earlier phase of the वेदान्त: *e. g.* as contained in the पञ्चदशी or as taught by भास्कर or, in still older times, by भर्तृप्रपञ्च [8]. Whatever the explanation of this kinship, it should be noted, that the doctrine in its essentials is not in the least affected by the सांख्य elements found in it.[9]

P. 1. 1. 1. अखण्ड—'partless'—a negative description. It does not affirm that Brahman is a whole, but only denies it has parts. ' Whole ' and ' parts ' are correlatives; and neither can be asserted of anything without implying the other.

— — सच्चिदानन्दं—to be interpreted negatively, being placed between two negative epithets. सत् does not predicate 'being' of आत्मन् but only denies 'becoming' of it. Similarly चित् and आनन्द do not predicate intelligence and bliss but only deny objectivity and strife that arises from the consciousness of mere diversity. Compare शंकर on तैत्ति. उ. II. i.

— — अवाङ्मनसगोचरं—Compare तैत्ति. उ. ii 4 and 9 and कठोप. vi. 12. See p. 11. l. 19 and note thereon. For the anomalous form वाङ्मनसे see पाणिनि V. iv. 77. गोचर- 'sphere of action,' 'range'. Literally ' cow-pasture. '

— . l. 2. आत्मानं—a term that signifies the immediacy and hence the certainty of Brahman or the ultimate Reality. Even though निर्गुण, it is not ' pure nothing ' for it is fundamentally one with our own self which it is impossible to negate.

— — अखिलाधारं—'अखिलस्याकाशादिप्रपञ्चस्याधार: आश्रयस्तामिति विग्रह: । आश्रयशब्दस्सृष्टिप्रलययोरप्युपलक्षणार्थ: । ' (V M).

N. B.—The first portion of the verse ending with आत्मानं points to the निर्गुणब्रह्म ; the epithet अखिलाधारम् describes the सगुण.

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7. Compare for instance Macdonell: 'India's Past' p. 149 Keith. 'History of Sanskrit Literature' p. 478: 'The Samkhy-System' pp. 102-4.

8. See Ind. Antq. for June 1924.

9. Compare पञ्चदशी vi. 28.

The former constitutes what is termed the स्वरूपलक्षण or 'definition through itself' and the latter, the तटस्थलक्षण or 'definition through another' of Brahman, for the distinction between which see वेदान्तपरिभाषा ch. vii pp. 341-3 (Venkatesvara Pr.)

P. 1. l. 2. अभीष्ट—*i. e.* the successful completion of the work undertaken. Comp. VM. S takes it to mean 'liberation' which is not relevant to the present context.

— . l. 3. अतीतद्वैतभावत:—the गुरु was अद्वयानन्द not in name only but in reality also, since he had attained to the peace (आनन्द) that comes from realising unity (अद्वय). He had transcended the consciousness of diversity as such. Compare—'द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवति' (बृह. उ. I. iv. 2). That is, the गुरु was a जीवन्मुक्त whose life has two phases-(i) that of समाधि when he is actually in union with Brahman. Variety does not exist for him then; (ii) that of व्युत्थान when he is engaged in ordinary activity, He is conscious of diversity then, but it does not affect him as it does, the common man since he has realised its underlying unity. See Introduction. VM takes the expression somewhat differently and also notes a variant reading—'अतीतद्वैतभावत इति पाठे तत्त्वज्ञानविध्वस्त निखिलभेदब्रह्मात्मत्वादित्यर्थ: ।

— . l. 4. गुरून्—'गुरूनित्येकस्मिन्बहुवचनं पूजार्थम् (V M).

— . l. 5. वेदान्त—literally 'end of Veda' which has come to mean the *aim* of the Veda (वेदसिद्धान्त). Historically it is the Upanishads that were first termed वेदान्त because they generally stood at the end of the Vedas.

— — उपनिषत्प्रमाणं—'उपनिषद्रूपमात्मन: प्रमाणमित्यर्थ: । यद्वा । उपनिषच्छब्देनात्मज्ञानमुच्यते । तस्य प्रमाणं कारणमित्यर्थ: ॥' (B). Compare S. For the etymology and meaning of the word उपनिषद्, see Deussen, 'Philosophy of the Upanishads' pp. 10-15.

— — तदुपकारीणि—तदनुसारीणि is another reading.

— — शारीरकसूत्रादीनि—'शरीरमेव शरीरकम् । शरीरके भवश्शारीरको जीव: ॥ (B); *i. e.* 'the embodied self.' This work, ascribed to बादरायण, is variously known as 'वेदान्तसूत्र', 'ब्रह्मसूत्र' and 'शारीरकसूत्र'. Of these the last which also seems to have been its original title brings out clearly its central aim *viz.* the ascertainment of the true nature of the individual self which, above everything else, is the proper subject of study for man. By आदि should be understood works like the भगवद्गीता.

P. 1. l. 6. प्रकरण--'a short treatise,' 'manual' or 'hand-book.' It is described thus—

शास्त्रैकदेशसंबद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम् ।
आहुः प्रकरणं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः ॥

— — अनुबन्ध--' indispensable element ', ' preliminary requisite ' ; literally ' what sticks to another '. The अनुबन्धाः are four in number as enumerated in the text and are hence known as अनुबन्धचतुष्टय. Their knowledge is regarded as essential before the study of any subject is seriously begun.

— . l. 7. तत्र—VM takes this as equivalent to वेदान्तशास्त्र; but probably not correctly as the fourfold अनुबन्ध in its general form is the same in the other studies as well. The Translation follows B.

— . l. 8. विधिवदधीत—The study should be formal. *i. e.*, it should be carried on under a proper गुरु in accordance with the rules laid down in that respect, such as observing the vow of celibacy etc. Note that the study of the Veda, unlike the performance of नित्यकर्म etc., should be in the present life.

— . l. 12. ज्योतिष्टोम—ज्योतिस्+स्तोम. Literally 'hymns in praise of अग्नि.' It is a sacrifice known also as अग्निष्टोम. The statement in the Text is in allusion to the Vedic injunction 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत.'

— . l. 13. ब्राह्मणहनन—The scriptural prohibition referred to here is 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः'

— — नित्यान्यकरणे प्रत्यवायेत्यादि—Here a question is raised as to how *abstention* from obligatory deeds, which is mere passivity, can give rise to the *positive* effect of sin. The answer given by the Advaitin is that these rites are meant to destroy one's past sin so that when they are not performed, that sin will remain as it was. It is only in this indirect way that their neglect is sinful. साधन accordingly is to be understood here as ज्ञापक 'suggestive', or 'indicative'. See Introduction as well as the prefatory remarks of शंकर in his commentary on the तैत्ति.उ.

— . l. 14. जातेष्टि—A Vedic rite to be performed by the father at the birth of a son.

— . l. 15. चान्द्रायण—This is a vow of the form of a fast in which the food is gradually diminished in the dark fortnight

and then similarly increased in the bright. The fast being thus regulated by the moon's increase and decrease is the reason why it is called चान्द्रायण.

N. B.— नित्यकर्म is generally obligatory while the नैमित्तिक is so only conditionally. The latter depends upon some specific occasion. There is of course a निमित्त in the case of the former also. *e. g.* द्विजत्व in regard to morning and evening prayers. Such a निमित्त is overlooked for, in the case of any particular individual, the presence or absence of it is once for all settled. प्रायश्चित्त also depends upon specific circumstances but it differs from the नैमित्तिककर्म in that it is occasioned by sinful acts.

P. 1. 1.15. उपासन—This is meditation, a mental operation involving an explicit use of the will. It is different from ज्ञान which does not depend upon will, but arises whenever the conditions for it such as contact of sense with object are fulfilled.

— . 1. 16. सगुणब्रह्म--as distinguished from निर्गुणब्रह्म. The Upanishads abound in meditative exercises. They refer not only to सगुणब्रह्म but also to various lower manifestations such as the sun. But the latter are ancillary and lead eventually to meditation upon सगुणब्रह्म. That is why they are not specifically mentioned here. The निर्गुणब्रह्मोपासन is right knowledge itself as taught in the Upanishads and is styled उपासन only secondarily (B). See Introduction for the distinction between सगुणब्रह्म and निर्गुणब्रह्म as well as for the place of उपासन in Vedantic discipline.

— — शाण्डिल्यविद्या—a well-known instance of सगुणब्रह्मोपासन. See छान्दो. उप. III xiv.

— . 1. 17. परमं प्रयोजनं—*i. e.* relatively speaking, for the truly final aim is liberation. (VM). This aim is explicitly mentioned in the स्मृति text quoted but not in the श्रुति text, where it should be taken as implied since right knowledge cannot be acquired in the absence of सत्त्वशुद्धि.

— . 1. 18. विविदिषन्तीत्यादि—This shows that what the performance of sacrifices etc. gives rise to is not release but ज्ञान or according to some, the desire for ज्ञान. That is, moral and religious discipline is necessary for the Vedantic disciple but not enough. This text is of great importance to the Advaitin

in rejecting the doctrine of ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय which maintains that release is as much the result of कर्म as of ज्ञान. See शंकर on वे. सू. III. iv 26 and सिद्धान्तलेशसंग्रह, pp. 349–56 (Kumbhakonam Edn.).

P. 1. l. 19. उपासनानामित्यादि—Every meditative exercise generally has its own particular फल also. So concentration mentioned here is to be understood as their common aim.

— . l. 20. अवान्तरफलं—since, as stated before, सत्त्वशुद्धि is their final aim.

— — सत्यलोक—ब्रह्मलोक, the highest of the seven upper worlds. It is here put for देवलोक in general. Compare the श्रुति quoted.

— . l. 21. विद्यया—*i. e.* 'by उपासन,' not right knowledge or सम्यग्-ज्ञान which has मोक्ष for its fruit.

— — साधनानि—The order of this four-fold equipment as given in the text indicates that each serves as the cause of the next following (B). See Introduction.

— . l. 22. इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः—*i. e.* absolute detachment. अर्थ is विषय. Compare the author's reference later (p. 2, ll 1 and 2) to विषयभोग.

P. 2. l. 1. कर्मजन्यतयानित्यत्वात्—This is a common argument for showing impermanence : यत्कार्यं तदनित्यम्.

— . l. 4. श्रवण—For the meaning of this term and its place in Vedantic discipline, see Introduction.

— . l. 6. उपरति—Note the double interpretation given in the Text. The first would not insist upon संन्यास as a necessary preliminary for entering upon Vedantic study, but in this sense it is hardly different from शम and दम. So a second interpretation follows. See वेदान्तपरिभाषा p. 430.

— . l. 7. विहितकर्म-नित्यकर्म and नैमित्तिककर्म.

— — विधिना परित्यागः—*i. e.* renouncing in the manner prescribed-not through idleness or disbelief in their efficacy, which would be sinful.

— . l. 8. तदनुगुणविषये—*e. g.* service to the teacher (B); practice of virtue like meekness (S).

— . l. 10. मुमुक्षुत्वं=मोक्षेच्छा. Raising the objection as to how इच्छा in any form is in consonance with the Vedantic aim, VM says : 'नायं दोषः। अनात्मविषयेच्छाया एव कामत्वात्।......मोक्षेच्छायास्तु,

आत्मविषयतया अकामत्वात् । ' अथाकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम आत्मकाम आप्तकामः (बृ. उ. IV iv 6) इति श्रुतेरात्मकामस्याप्तकामत्वेनाकामत्वावगतेः ॥ '.

P. 3. l. 13. दोष—sin which is nothing but narrow love and hate.

— — यथोक्तकारिणे—'शास्त्रोक्तस्वधर्मस्य यथाशास्त्रमनुष्ठात्रे'–Ramatirtha's commentary on उपदेशसाहस्री.

— . l. 15. सततं—VM construes this with प्रदेयम्. The Translation follows Ramatirtha's com : on उपदेशसाहस्री.

— . l. 16. जीवब्रह्मैक्यं— ' क्षीरनीरवत्परस्परविभिन्नयोस्समानाभिहारस्यैक्यशब्दार्थत्वात् जीवब्रह्मणोरपि स्वरूपतो भिन्नयोरैक्यं मिश्रीभाव इति शङ्का स्यात् । स मा भूदिति व्याचष्टे शुद्धं चैतन्यमिति ॥ '

(VM) Strictly according to Advaita, the theme of the Vedanta is the identity or more properly the non-distinction between Brahman and the जीव. But at the same time, it is not wrong to say that it is Brahman or pure spirit, for the identity is not conceived as other than Brahman and predicated of it. The non-duality (अद्वैत) itself *is* Brahman. Just as भूतले घटाभावः signifies the भूतल itself, ब्रह्मणि जीवभेदाभावः does, ब्रह्म itself.

— — प्रमेयं–This should be taken as loosely said, for Brahman is not *known* through a प्रमाण which would make it objective and so not all-comprehensive. See Note on page 11.l.19. Or as VM suggests, the expression is equivalent to ' yet unknown and therefore requiring to be known.' This is according to the view that valid knowledge should be *new* knowledge. Compare—अज्ञातं ब्रह्म विषयः ज्ञातं ब्रह्म प्रयोजनम्.' See वेदान्तपरिभाषां page20.

— — तत्रैव वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यात्—The establishment of this point is the aim of ब्रह्म सू. I i 4.

— . l. 17. तदैक्यं–' तच्च तत् ऐक्यं च' (B).

— . l. 18. प्रयोजनं—This comprehends removal of evil and attainment of good. The quotations are intended to support these two aspects of मोक्ष.

— . l. 19. शोकं—' शोकोपलक्षितं संसारम् ' (B).

— . l. 22. उपहारपाणि :—according to the custom that a गुरु should not be approached with empty hands : ' रिक्तहस्तेन नोपेयाद्राजानं दैवतं गुरुम् '.

— — श्रोत्रिय—See Panini V. ii. 84. ' श्रोत्रियत्वं वेदवेदाङ्गपारंगत्वं वेदान्तार्थपारगत्वं वा प्रकृतोपयोगात् ' (VM).

— — ब्रह्मनिष्ठ—निष्ठा is 'devotion'. निश्चयेन स्थितिः.

P. 2 . l. 23. समित्पाणि :–cf. उपहारपाणि: used above. 'समिच्छब्दो गुरो-रनुरूपोपायनमात्रोपलक्षणपर: ' (VM)

— . l. 24. अध्यारोप literally means 'superposition' and अपवाद, 'denial'. This method is necessitated by the निर्गुण nature of Brahman which is to be taught. By superposing upon it characteristics provisionally, the attention of the disciple is easily drawn to it first; and then those characteristics are denied in order to make the teaching correct. Without such superposition, Brahman might be regarded as absolute nothing. Or to put it differently—the teacher begins with variety which is given in experience and, by denying it as mere appearance, points to its ground as the sole reality. :See Introduction. Compare—

' अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते ।
शिष्याणां बोधसिध्यर्थं तत्त्वज्ञैः कल्पित: क्रम: ॥ '

— . l. 26. वस्तु–' कालत्रयानपाय्यात्मैव वस्तुशब्दार्थ :।' (S). अवस्तु–'अनिर्वचनीय-मित्यर्थ: ' (B).

— . l. 28. सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं–So it is not right to think that अज्ञान or माया is unreal or illusory. Nor should अनिर्वचनीय be taken as merely 'inexplicable'. The word means only that it cannot be expressed as either 'is' or 'is not.' If it were real, it would never be sublated; if unreal, it would never appear. So it must be other than both.' सच्चेन्न बाध्येत । असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत ॥'

— — त्रिगुणात्मकं...भावरूपं–See Introduction.

— — ज्ञानविरोधि–opposed to ज्ञान, *i. e.* dispelled by it. In fact ज्ञाननिवर्त्य is an old definition of माया.

— . l. 29. अहमज्ञ:—The very attempt to philosophise implies ignorance in respect of the ultimate truth. So अज्ञान is actually given in experience and is described as साक्षिभास्य. अज्ञान, being जड, cannot show itself and is dependent for its revelation upon spirit or चैतन्य. To cite an example from the physical realm : the moon being dark cannot show itself and owes its luminosity to the sun.

P. 3. l. 1. समष्टि and व्यष्टि—These are words derived from the root अश् 'to pervade,' and are therefore etymologically different from समास and व्यास which come from the root अस् 'to be', though meaning practically the same. The words

literally mean 'all-pervading' and 'of limited pervasion'. Compare passage later in the Text beginning with अत्र व्यस्तेत्यादि (ll. 14–15.)

P. 3. l. 1, एकमनेकमिति—This explanation is necessitated by the use in the Veda and the Upanishads and, following them, in later Vedantic works, of the word माया and its equivalents sometimes in the singular and sometimes in the plural. Compare passages quoted later in the Text.

— . l. 4. नानात्वेनेत्यादि–Each जीव has its own अज्ञान which is revealed by its साक्षिन्.

— . l. 5. अजामेकामित्यादि श्रुतेः—The ablative case here is of questionable accuracy. What is required here is an *illustration* of the usage, not an *authority* for it. Comp. VM 'अज्ञानैकत्वव्यपदेशिनीं श्रुतिं पठति।'

— — उत्कृष्टोपाधितया–All अज्ञान is an adjunct of spirit; but the समष्ट्यज्ञान being cosmic or universal is without its evil feature *viz.* आवरण or concealment of the underlying unity. Whatever is universalised ceases to be evil. So it is described as उत्कृष्टोपाधि. VM explains it as 'उत्कृष्टस्योपाध्यन्तराननुरक्ततया अप्रतिहतज्ञानात्मकस्य चैतन्यस्य उपाश्रितया, which also eventually comes to mean the same. Compare निकृष्ट below.

— . l. 6. विशुद्धसत्त्व—The word विशुद्ध does not imply the entire absence of रजस् and तमस्. It only means, that they are negligibly small in माया as characterising ईश्वर. Compare पञ्चदशी; Ch :i44-5.

— — उपहितं—That on which the उपाधि is superposed.

— . l. 7. अव्यक्त—'unmanifest', because it represents the causal state. It will be stated later that ईश्वर is both the efficient and the material cause. (p, 4, ll 17–19).

— — अन्तर्यामिन्–'controlling from within' as distinguished from सर्वनियन्तृ which is taken to suggest control from outside.

— . l. 8. सकलाज्ञानावभासकत्वात्–The अज्ञान of a जीव as stated above is revealed by that particular साक्षिन्; the totality of अज्ञान by the totality of spirit *viz.* ईश्वरसाक्षिन्, so that nothing that is, is beyond its ken.

— — यस्सर्वज्ञस्सर्ववित्—The interpretation of this extract from the मुण्ड. उ: given in the Translation is in accordance with the com. of शंकर on it.

— . l. 9. कारणशरीरं—The सांख्य and some other systems recognise only two kinds of bodies, the gross (स्थूलशरीर) and the

subtle (सूक्ष्मशरीर.) The Advaita admits these as well as another known as कारणशरीर. It is अज्ञान itself into which the other two lapse in सुषुप्ति. मोक्ष means the dissolution of the third also.

P. 3. l. 10. आनन्दमयकोश—Five such *kosas* are recognised. See तैत्ति. उ. ii. This state of ईश्वर is described as आनन्दप्रचुर inasmuch as it is associated with माया and is thus different from निर्गुणब्रह्म which is आनन्द itself. See S.

— — सुषुप्ति—This is a state of the soul. Two more states-confining our attention to the empirical self-also are recognised. See माण्डू. उ. The mutual relation of the five *kosas* and the three *avasthas* may be stated as follows-The adjunct of the self in its state of सुषुप्ति is the कारणशरीर or what is the same, the आनन्दमयकोश; that in the state of dream is, in addition to the preceding, the सूक्ष्मशरीर or what is the same, the विज्ञानमय-कोश, मनोमयकोश and प्राणमयकोश; and that in the state of waking is, in addition to the preceding two, the स्थूलशरीर or what is the same, the अन्नमयकोश.

N. B. As regards the meaning of the three states in reference to ईश्वर, see Introduction.

— . l. 14. इन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यादि-This apparently was a description of Indra who was, at one stage in the development of Vedic thought, regarded as the supreme God and माया, his magic power. The Advaitins understand from 'Indra' here ईश्वर and from माया, his adjunct by means of which he manifests himself in diverse manner-as countless *jivas*. ईयते=प्रतीयते (B)*i.e.* Brahman though not many, is seen as many *jivas* by reason of the multiplicity of अज्ञान.

— . l. 16. मलिनसत्त्व-See Note on शुद्धसत्त्व above. The सत्त्वगुण of अज्ञान is here tainted or obscured by रजस् and तमस्.

— . l. 17. प्राज्ञः—प्रकर्षेण जानातीति प्रज्ञः। प्रज्ञ एव प्राज्ञः। See पाणिनि V. iv 38. It would be better to understand the term here as प्रायेण अज्ञः as VM does. शंकर in his commentary on the माण्डू. उ. wherefrom this word is taken, gives two explanations of which one is—'प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रमस्यैवासाधारणं रूपमिति प्राज्ञः। इतरयोर्विशेषमपि ज्ञानमस्ति ॥'. That is, the state is characterised by subconsciousness, if we may so term it, and not by discriminating knowledge as well. Hence the statement in the Text later—अस्य प्राज्ञत्वमित्यादि.

— . l. 18. अहंकारादिकारणत्वात्—The word अहंकार is here equivalent to अन्तःकरण of which, as we shall soon know, it is com-

monly counted as one phase. The अन्तःकरण merges in अज्ञान in सुषुप्ति and emerges from it when the person passes into dream or waking. The अन्तःकरण, as a part of the physical universe, is no doubt an evolute of माया; but that does not clash with the statement above, since अज्ञान which is the adjunct of the जीव is not other than माया.

P. 3. l. 19. आनन्दप्रचुरत्वात्—as compared with waking and dream where pain exists along with pleasure.

— . l. 20. सर्वोपरमत्वात्–the individual's world becoming latent then.

— . l. 22. अज्ञानवृत्तिभिः—According to Advaita, ज्ञान is an अन्तःकरणवृत्ति 'state of the internal organ.' In सुषुप्ति the अन्तःकरण like everything else is merged in अज्ञान. Hence the joy that is experienced then should be through an अज्ञानवृत्ति. This is in the case of the जीव. In respect of ईश्वर no अन्तःकरण is recognised and all His ज्ञान is of the form of मायावृत्ति.

— . l. 21. चैतन्यदीप्ताभिः—The modifications of the cosmic or individual अज्ञान called *vrittis* are illumined by spirit and it is this complex of वृत्ति and spirit reflected in it that constitutes the experience of सुषुप्ति and not the वृत्ति by itself. In the case of dreams and waking experience of the *jiva* we have to substitute अन्तःकरणवृत्ति for अज्ञानवृत्ति in the above description See वेदान्तपरिभाषा Ch : i, pp. 42 ff.

— — अतिसूक्ष्माभिः—' indistinct '. ' अस्पष्टाभिरित्यर्थः ' (B)

— . l. 22. आनन्दभुगित्यादि—This cites scriptural authority for joy being experienced in deep sleep. चेतोमुखः—One in deep sleep is so described, because, though not characterised by common knowledge then, he is on the point of passing into it—when he wakes up or begins to dream.

— . l. 23. सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्—This supplies proof from common experience in support of the same.

— . l. 25. ईश्वरप्राज्ञयोरभेदः—See Introduction. The अभेद, if taken literally, is not only against common experience (compare the feeling नाहमीश्वरः), but also against the accepted Advaitic view which recognises a well-defined distinction between the two. Compare—

' जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चित्तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा ।
अविद्या तच्चितोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः ॥ '

We have accordingly to understand by अभेद here only the identity of spirit (स्वरूपैक्य) underlying both *i.e.* of the *viseshyas* and not of the *Viseshanas viz.* ईश्वर and जीव. The relation between the two is thus really भेदाभेद or तादात्म्य, as it is termed. Compare शंकर on वे. सू. I ii 6 and on माण्डू. उ. p. 15 (Anandasrama Edn.). Compare also B which, however, gives a far-fetched interpretation of भेद as भेदक. The अभेद between the adjuncts mentioned in the previous sentence is also भेदाभेद, but in a somewhat different sense because it is between entities which are जड and not as here between entities involving spirit. It is सत्तैक्ये सति मिथो भेद:—their being is the same; yet they appear different.

P. 3. l. 28. अनुपहिताकाश—Conditioned space is in unconditioned space through the condition.

— . l. 29. तुरीय—The word is really चतुरीय with the first syllable left out. See वार्तिक on पाणिनी V ii 51. It is the fourth in reference to the three states of waking, dream and sleep or as B suggests—अज्ञान, जीव and ईश्वर, the three so far described. See also S.

P. 4. l. 1. तप्तायः पिण्डवत्—The fire and the iron-ball are not always distinguished as is shown by expressions like 'The iron-ball scorched his hands'.

— . l. 2. वाच्य and लक्ष्य—These are the two varieties of meaning which words and sentences also, according to some, have. For further explanation of these terms as well as for the import of the *Mahavakyas*, see later.

— . l. 4. आच्छादयतीव-We might also instance the solar eclipse where the sun, unlike the moon, when eclipsed is really unaffected and only *appears* so. The illustrations bring out clearly how according to Advaita, bondage and release are purely questions of stand-point.

— . l. 6. अवलोकयितृ—'spectator. in the case of the sun and 'empirical self' (प्रमातृ) in the case of Brahman.

— . l. 12. कर्तृत्वेत्यादि—This describes the nature of the जीव, When such features are fancied in Brahman, it is said to be the जीव.

— . l. 13. तुच्छ—Strictly this means 'absolute nothing'. But the Advaitin does not take the world to be असत्. It is सदसद्विलक्षण. Hence the word तुच्छकल्प here.

P. 4. l. 13. स्वाज्ञानेनावृतायां रज्ज्वां--This is only roughly correct. In the सिद्धान्त it is always चैतन्य that can be obscured for that alone is luminous. Everything else, like the 'rope' here, is itself जड, and needs no external cause for being obscured. See B.

— . l. 17. लिङ्ग—लिङ्गशरीर for the constituents of which see later.

— — ब्रह्माण्ड—literally 'Brahma-egg', the universe.

— l. 19. निमित्तं...उपादानं च–The same Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. This is known as the doctrine of अभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानत्वम् in which रामानुज agrees with शंकर. The conception of causation may be either mechanical as in the case of a 'jar' for example or organic as in the case of a 'plant.' Here it is the latter view that is to be taken. Even in the case of organic growth as known to us, external aids are needed such as air, water &c. But in the case of Brahman, there being nothing outside it by hypothesis, whatever is required for the manifestation of the universe should be found in Brahman itself. In its aspect of चैतन्य, it is described as निमित्तकारण, for the efficient cause is intelligent; in its other aspect, it is उपादानकारण or material cause.

— . l. 20. यथा लूतेत्यादि—Compare मुण्ड. उ. : I i 7

— . l. 21. आकाशः...उत्पद्यते-- Contrast the वैशेषिक doctrine according to which the 'elements' are all equally eternal and ultimate.

— . l. 23. तेषु जाड्याधिक्यादित्यादि--This conclusion is based upon the principle that the material cause must be essentially the same as the effect.

— — तदानीं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीत्यादि-According to B the expression सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि here stands for the effects of the three *gunas* *viz.* जाड्य etc. (See सांख्यकारिका 13); and they appear in आकाश and the other 'elements' according to the proportion in which the three *gunas* enter into the making up of each. तदानीं = 'सृष्टिकाले' (B). कारणगुणप्रक्रमेण–*i. e.* according to the principle that the characteristics of the material cause determine those of the effect. उत्पद्यन्ते = अभिव्यज्यन्ते according to the सत्कार्यवाद accepted in this respect.

— . l. 25. सूक्ष्मभूतानि--in contrast to स्थूलभूतानि which are compound in their nature.

P. 4. l. 25. सूक्ष्मशरीर—The सांख्य also uses this term but there, its constituents, which are only partly the same as here, are eighteen. See सांख्यकारिका 40. Here they are seventeen–or nineteen if we reckon चित्त and अहंकार separately. Compare on this point as a whole वेदान्तपरिभाषा pp. 357-64.

— . l. 29. श्रोत्रेत्यादि—Note the order of the senses as mentioned here follows the order in which the 'elements', according to तैत्ति उ. II, spring into being from Brahman. This is what is meant by क्रमेण. पृथक् पृथक्—*i. e.* 'one from one'.

P. 5 . l. 2. अनयोरेवेत्यादि—Compare—

'मनोबुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तं करणमान्तरम् ।
संशयो निश्चयो गर्वस्स्मरणं विषया अमी ॥'

मानसोल्लास-Com : on the दक्षिणामूर्तिस्तोत्र ii 35–6.

— — एते–बुद्धिमनसी (neut. dual).

— . l. 3. मिलितेभ्यः—The मनस् and बुद्धि co-operate with all the senses. Hence it is inferred that they should partake of the character of all the five 'elements' which taken singly give rise to the five organs of knowing.

— . l. 6. इहलोकपरलोकगामी—*i. e.* the transmigrating entity. The description strictly applies to the लिङ्गशरीर as a whole, though the Text confines it here to the विज्ञानमयकोश. See later.

— . l. 10. प्राग्गमनवान्—'प्राग्गमनमग्रतो निस्सरणम्' (VM).

— . l. 11. व्यान—represents that aspect of vital power which accounts for the circulation of the blood in all parts of the body.

— . l. 15. क्षुत्करः—क्षुधाकर : is another reading which means 'causing hunger'.

— . l. 17. केचित्—'कापिलमतानुसारिणः' (S).

— . l.20. एतेषु कोशेष्वित्यादि—The विज्ञानमयकोश is the agent in knowing and the मनोमयकोश is the means, मनस् being regarded as an इन्द्रिय.

— . l. 24. एकबुद्धिविषयतया=एकत्वबुद्धिविषयतया. अनेक बुद्धिविषयतया also should be understood similarly.

— . l. 26. सूत्रात्मन्—See बृ. उ : III vii 1 and 2.

— . l. 30. तेजोमयेत्यादि—The internal organ is made up of all the five 'elements' as already stated, but तेजस् predominates. Hence this description, according to the principle प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति.

P. 6 l. 2. विज्ञानमयादिकोशत्रयं—For the manner of construing this expression, see S and VM.

— . l. 4. मनोवृत्तिभिः—Compare Note on अज्ञानवृत्तिभिः above.

— — सूक्ष्मविषयान्—We might say 'private' objects—not 'public' ones as during waking. 'जाग्रद्वासनामयानीषदस्फुटान्' (VM).

— . l. 8. पञ्चीकरण—According to this view, a particle of gross पृथ्वी (say) = $\frac{1}{2}$ पृथ्वी + $\frac{1}{8}$ अप् + $\frac{1}{8}$ तेजस् + $\frac{1}{8}$ वायु + $\frac{1}{8}$ आकाश. The statement in the text as well as the verse quoted in its support is very terse. What is meant is that each of the four one-eighth parts of each 'element' is to be combined with one of the reserved halves, leaving out only in each case that half which is the same in kind as the eighth part in question.

— . l. 14. त्रिवृत्करणश्रुति-See छान्दो. उ.: VI iii. This Upanishad mentions only three 'elements' instead of five and marks historically an earlier stage. See Deussen *op. cit.* pp. 189ff. It should be noted that the पञ्चीकरणप्रक्रिया is not mentioned either by बादरायण or शंकर and is to be found only in later commentators like आनन्दज्ञान (See वे. सू. II iv 20). Compare also B pp. 58–9.

— . l. 29. सर्वनराभिमानित्वात्-The वैश्वानर like the सूत्रात्मन् is immanent in all beings-not merely men-and feels attached to each alike. 'सर्वप्राणिनिकायेष्वहमित्यभिमानवत्त्वात् वैश्वानरत्वम्' (S) Compare भगवद्गीता XV. 14.

— . l. 30. विविधं राजमानत्वात्—This explains the title विराज्.

— — अन्नविकारत्वात्-In the case of विराज्, अन्न should be understood as 'matter'; in the case of विश्व, as the food eaten.

P. 7. l. 1. स्थूलभोग-स्थूलपदार्थभोग.

— — जाग्रत्-In this state, attachment is not transferred from the subtle body to the gross but extended from the one to the other.

— . l. 3. स्थूलशरीरादिप्रविष्टत्वात्—As the gross body, commonly speaking, is the outermost adjunct of the self there is nothing which आदि here may signify. For possible interpretations of it, see VM.

प्रविष्टत्वात्-being derived from the root विश् to enter; it suggests why the जीव is called विश्व. 'विश्वशरीरवर्तित्वाद्विश्व इत्युक्तं भवति' (VM). The words विश्व and सर्व are different in so far as the former has a distributive and the latter a collective force

P. 7. l. 5. दिग्वातार्केत्यादि-These are only the deified cosmic counterparts of the senses. Compare वेदान्तपरिभाषा p. 357 ff.

— . l. 10 चैत्त—to be taken as equivalent to स्मरण on the authority of the stanza already cited.

— . l. 13. इदानीं प्रत्यगात्मनीत्यादि-Now is stated what are commonly superposed upon the individual self as distinguished from the cosmic, the superpositions upon which have so far been described. 'अधुना त्वंपदार्थविषयमध्यारोपं बहुवादिमतेनोपन्यस्यति' (VM). See also S.

— — प्रत्यगात्मन्—literally means 'internal self'—the true self finally reached when disengaged from the several forms of not-self like the material body associated with it.

N. B. We have here a gradual approach to the true self commencing from the most primitive belief that the self is a concrete something clearly different from it, because it is external to it. We need not assume that all the stages noticed here are historical. They are partly speculative and are intended only to mark logical stages in the progress of thought. It may also be noted that in respect of each position, the author cites a triple support—scripture, reason and direct experience. This is only aiming at symmetry in exposition and does not mean that in every case, as for instance in regard to the चार्वाक or the बौद्ध, the श्रुति is consciously relied upon as an authority. The scriptural texts are generally quoted without reference to the true context and sometimes imply ridicule of the holders of the views in question.

— . l. 24. अतिप्राकृतस्त्वित्यादि--It is not possible to think of any stage in the evolution of thought when this view of the self is uniformly held. But it certainly marks a passing attitude of man under certain circumstances.

— . l. 26. आत्मेति वदति--The expression being the index of a corresponding belief.

— — चार्वाक—the Indian materialist or naturalist. The exact significance of the term is not known. Sometimes it is taken as the name of a disciple of बृहस्पति, the supposed founder of this school of thought. It is probably a shorter form of चारु-वाक् ' sweet-tongued. ' See Whitney : ' Sans: Gram:' †233.

P. . l. 28. स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहं—'stoutness' and 'leanness' are bodily features. Since they are here predicated of "I", the self is deduced to be the body. It is really a case of transferring to the owner what belongs to the owned. The usage, according to Advaita, is to be explained as an illegitimate transference (अध्यारोप or अध्यास) to the self of what characterises the not-self.

— . l. 29. अपरश्चार्वाकः—Several varieties of naturalism were known in ancient India. Some maintained that there was no self other than the material body; others were vitalists, holding that there was no principle higher than life; and so forth.

— — ते ह प्राणा इत्यादि—The word प्राण is used in more than one sense both in the Upanishads and in later Vedantic literature. Here it is clear from the context that the organs of sense are meant. The emphasis is on ऊचुः, 'spoke', which implies that the organs are sentient (B). The श्रुति is thus to be understood as a support for the view not directly but by *implication* (लिङ्ग) (VM).

— l. 30. इन्द्रियाणामभाव इत्यादि— in sleep for example where the organs of knowing are at rest, the movement of the body which may be taken as the sign of the self is absent. See VM. The body here appears to depend upon the senses and therefore not ultimate.

— — काणोऽहं—See note on स्थूलोऽहं above.

P. 8. l. 2. प्राणाभाव इत्यादि—प्राण here is the vital principle-मुख्यप्राण as VM says. This indicates that the senses are dependent upon the प्राण and therefore cannot themselves be ultimate.

— . l. 3. अहमशनायावानित्यादि—Hunger and thirst are features of the vital principle for they directly contribute to its upkeep (VM).

— . l. 5. मनसि सुप्ते—*e. g.* in a swoon when life may be suspended (B). Contrast VM.

— — अहं संकल्पवानित्यादि—Desire and doubt are features of मनस्. See बृह. उ. I. iii. 5.

— . l. 6. बौद्धः—This is in reference only to one school of Buddhism *viz.* the विज्ञानवाद, according to which विज्ञान or, more strictly, the momentary series of conscious states is the self. बुद्धि is accordingly to be understood here as the

equivalent of 'idea' and not, as in Advaita, a phase of the internal organ.

P. 8. l. 7. कर्तुरित्यादि—मनस् is viewed as an इन्द्रिय or instrument of knowledge. As an instrument, it implies a wielder of it and cannot itself be ultimate. Compare पञ्चदशी iii 8. Those that take मनस् as a sense argue that, as an external object like a 'jar' to be perceived needs an external sense, internal objects like सुख also need an internal sense which is मनस्.

— . l. 8. प्राभाकरतार्किकारित्यादि—The view attributed to these two schools of thought is at first sight rather startling since neither maintains it as stated here. They both hold ज्ञान is an adventitious feature of the self and so different from it. If ज्ञान be *different* from the self, it may well be thought that the self is अज्ञान (B).

— . l. 9. बुद्ध्यादीनामित्यादि—as in deep sleep when, according to these schools, the self endures but is absolutely unconscious. By आदि is to be understood qualities of the self like love, hate, pain, pleasure etc. लय='disappearance'.

— . l. 10. अहमज्ञः अहं ज्ञानी—These imply that ज्ञान appears in the self and disappears; and that consequently the self is जड.

— . l. 11. भाट्टाः—This is the other well-known मीमांसा school that follows कुमारिलभट्ट. It maintains that the empirical ego, the अहंपदार्थ, which according to Advaita is a blend of the अन्तःकरण and साक्षिन्, is itself the आत्मन्. The self according to this school is not only the subject that *knows*; but, being also *known*, it partakes of the character of an object. The Advaitins maintain that what is known here is only the objective element in the अहंपदार्थ *viz.* the internal organ. The spiritual element in it, though itself unknowable, appears to be known, as pure water which is in itself invisible is seen when it is coloured.

— — प्रज्ञानघनः-so, of the nature of intelligence. आनन्दमयः *i. e.* mostly bliss and partly the reverse of it which is a sign of the inert (VM).

— — प्रकाशाप्रकाशसद्भावात्—as respectively indicated by the two phases of the later reminiscence : 'I slept happily; I did not know anything.' See VM.

— . l. 12. अज्ञानोपहित—'अज्ञानोपहितत्वमज्ञानसंवलितत्वम्' (VM).

P. 8. l. 13. अपरो बौद्धः—the माध्यमिक who is a nihilist (शून्यवादिन्).

— — असदेवेत्यादि—The meaning of असत् in this scriptural citation when rightly understood is not 'non-being' but 'undifferentiated being.'

— . l. 14. अहं सुषुप्तौ नासं-This must be understood as referring only to the common view that one *was not* in sleep because one did not have any experience then in the ordinary sense.

— . l. 16. एतेषामित्यादि—This passage is intended to show how the various superpositions have no real relation to the self (B). The refutation of the preceding views as set forth here is two-fold -(i) each school refutes the previous one and is itself refuted by the succeeding one, so that all stand refuted; (ii) a direct refutation based upon scriptural texts, reasoning and direct experience.

— . l. 19. प्रत्यगित्यादि--The self being internal (प्रत्यक्) cannot be the 'son' who is external (पराक्). Similarly it cannot be the body, because it is described in the scripture as अस्थूल; it cannot be प्राण, because it is stated to be devoid of it and अप्राण so forth.

— . l. 20. चिन्मात्रं--being spirit and spirit alone, the view of the भाट्ट school that it is objective also cannot be right.

— — प्रबलश्रुति--The weightiness of the scriptural texts in question is due to the fact that their import is justified by the context and the other considerations required for determining the true teaching of the Veda. They are-

'उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥'

— . l. 21. चैतन्यभास्यत्वेन...अनित्यत्वात्—What is meant is that objects like पुत्र cannot be ultimate, for they depend upon spirit for their revelation quite as much as a 'jar' (say) while spirit reveals itself.

— . l. 22. विद्वदनुभव--mystic experience of the जीवन्मुक्त. See Introduction.

— . l. 24. शुद्धं—not touched by evil or संसार. मुक्त 'signifies that it is always free-not merely after the so-called release. बुद्ध—'self-luminous' in the sense that no external aid is necessary for revealing it.

P. 8. l. 26. अपवाद—'अवस्तुभूतस्य वस्त्वात्मना निर्देश:' (B). That is, revealing the truth of an appearance by pointing to the reality behind it. अवस्तु—'what is not real' or perhaps 'lower reality' but not 'unreal'. The essence of a thing is its material cause. But an effect may be a *real* transformation of the material cause, when it is called विकार or परिणाम ; or it may be an *apparent* transformation, when it is called विवर्त. It is the latter that is meant here. Compare—'उपादानसमसत्ताक: परिणाम: । उपादानविषमसत्ताको विवर्त: ॥' Compare also सूतसंहिता (IV ii 8) 'अधिष्ठानावशेषो हि नाश: कल्पितवस्तुन: । '.

— . l. 28. सतत्त्व=तत्त्व. Compare तत्तुल्य for तुल्य in 'श्रीरामनामतत्तुल्यम्'

— . l. 30. भोगायतनं—भोगस्य सुखदु:खानुभवस्य आयतनमुपलब्धिस्थानम्.

P. 9. l. 5. व्युत्क्रमेण—'in the reverse order' *i. e.* realising that पृथिवी is nothing but अप् ; अप्, nothing but तेजस्; and so forth.

— . l. 8. तत्त्वंपदार्थशोधनं—See Introduction.

— . l. 6 महावाक्यार्थ—A proposition to be understood presupposes a knowledge of the meanings of the terms constituting it. In the present case, the meanings of तत् and त्वम् have been explained. Hence the attempt now to explain the meaning of the proposition itself. The *maha-vakyas* are usually reckoned as four—one taken from each Veda. These are प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म (ऐत. उ. v), तत्त्वमसि (छान्दो. उ.VI viii 7), अहं ब्रह्मास्मि (बृह उ.: I iv 10) and अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (माण्डू. उ. : 2).

— . l. 9. अज्ञानादि—By आदि here we should understand, in the case of the cosmic self, the adjuncts of हिरण्यगर्भ and विराज् ; and, in the case of the individual, the subtle and gross bodies.

— . l. 17. अखण्डार्थ—*i. e.* निर्गुणब्रह्म which is relationless. It has no inner parts to which it may bear relation ; nor has it anything outside to be externally related to it. Note the negative form अखण्ड. Compare Note on benedictory verse.

N. B. The following will be helpful in understanding the interpretation of *maha-vakyas*. The import of a proposition is commonly regarded as संसर्ग *i. e.* an objective relation among the things denoted by the several terms constituting the proposition. In दण्डेन गां नय which consists of words, not in grammatical agreement, the import is भेदरूप संसर्ग; in a sentence like नीलमुत्पलं which consists of words in grammatical agreement

it is अभेदरूपसंसर्ग. The *maha-vakyas* being of the latter type we shall confine our attention to it in what follows —

The final meaning of नीलमुत्पलं arrived at according to the principle of अभेदसंसर्ग is नीलाभिन्नमुत्पलम्. This is the logical goal of the statement. The psychological process by which this goal is reached is described as follows—

(i) We know from our acquaintance with the Sanskrit language that नील means a colour—a quality characterised by the property of नीलत्व ('blue-ness'). We also know that उत्पल means substance, characterised by the property of उत्पलत्व. The connotation (प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त) being thus different in the two cases, we presume that their denotation also is distinct and that they point to separate things. Noticing, however, the grammatical agreement between the two words in the sentence we conclude that despite their difference in connotation, they are intended to denote the same thing–that is, their denotation is the same. This is the first stage described as सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञान.

(ii) Now in order to find out the common denotation, we ralate the meanings of the two words as विशेषण and विशेष्य *i. e.* as attribute and substance or, if we prefer to put it so, as subject and predicate: and arrive at the knowledge of a certain thing which while being characterised by उत्पलत्व has also the characteristic of नीलत्व. This is the second stage described as विशेषणविशेष्यताज्ञान. At this stage we directly get to the ultimate significance of the sentence *viz.* नीलाभिन्नमुत्पलम्.

(iii) So far the process of interpreting तत्त्वमसि is similar. But while in the case of नीलमुत्पलम्, the relating of the meanings of the two words as विशेषण and विशेष्य presents no logical difficulty, it does so in the case of तत्त्वमसि. For the वाच्यार्थ of त्वम् is अपरोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्य and that of तत्, परोक्षत्वादिविशिष्टचैतन्य which cannot be related in the अभेदसंसर्ग way on account of their inherent opposition. To avoid this logical *impasse*, we have recourse to लक्षणा. In other words, the meaning of अभेद being impossible taking the वाच्यार्थ, we try the लक्ष्यार्थ *viz.* अपरोक्षत्वाद्युपलक्षितचैतन्य and परोक्षत्वाद्युपलक्षितचैतन्य. This removes the contradiction and we conclude that the identity conveyed by the proposition is that between these two. This stage is described as

लक्ष्यलक्षणभावज्ञान, the विशिष्ट being the लक्षक and the उपलक्षित the लक्ष्य. It is, however, carefully to be noted that the अभेद here is not of a संसर्ग type as in नीलमुत्पलम् which involves duality, but what is known as स्वरूपाभेद. In other words the ultimate logical significance of तत्त्वमसि is the ultimate Reality which discards all adjectives or predicates as incompatible with its nature-the शुद्धचैतन्य- not a संसृष्टार्थ, but an अखण्डार्थ. This is according to what has been stated by सुरेश्वर in the stanza quoted in the Text. Compare- संक्षेपशारीरिक, i 196–7. See also वेदान्तसूत्रभाष्य (IV i 2).

P. 9. l. 17. संबन्धत्रयम्—सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्ध, विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंबन्ध and लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्ध. 'संबन्धस्संबंधवद्धुभयनिरूपणीयत्वात्' (VM).

— — सामानाधिकरण्यं—'समानविभक्त्यन्तयो: पदयोरेकस्मिन्नर्थे तात्पर्यम्' (B).

— . l. 24. तात्पर्यसंबन्धं—The grammatical agreement between two words shows that they are meant to refer to one and the same thing or group of things, whatever their difference be in the connotation.

— . l. 25. परोक्षत्वादिविशिष्ट—ईश्वर is mediately known through Reasoning or Revelation, while our own self is immediate to each one of us. By आदि here should be understood characteristics like omniscience of ईश्वर and limited knowledge of the जीव.

P. 10. l. 6. भागलक्षणा—also known as भागत्यागलक्षणा *i. e.* understanding as the implied or secondary meaning, a *part* of the primary meaning, leaving out the other part.

— . l. 8. अन्योऽन्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावेत्यादि—There are three possibilities stated here—(i) the import may be a relation, (ii) it may be the related with either object viewed as adjectival to the other, or (iii) it may be identity between the two complexes *viz.* नीलगुणविशिष्ट and उत्पलत्वविशिष्ट. All the three, it appears should be taken as falling under the head of what has been described above as अभेद संसर्ग.

— . l. 14. प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधात्—The identity of the जीव and ईश्वर is against Reason as well as Revelation, because one is the worshipper and the other, the worshipped. As regards its being in conflict with perception, a question may be raised as to how it can be so, since ईश्वर is not admitted to be perceivable.

The answer is that–though ईश्वर is not प्रत्यक्ष, the जीव is;. and that therefore the difference between the two would be प्रत्यक्ष. Since features of ईश्वर such as 'omniscience' are not found in the जीव which is immediate, we may gather that the two are not the same (B). See VM also.

P 10. l. 15. संसर्ग and विशिष्ट here stand respectively for what we have described above as अभेदसंसर्ग and भेदसंसर्ग. The latter is also sometimes termed भेद. See *Tika* on बृहद्वार्तिक 'Introduction' st. 902.

— . l. 17. जहल्लक्षणा—Words may have a primary (वाच्य) or a secondary (लक्ष्य) meaning. The process by which the former is indicated is known as अभिधा; the latter, लक्षणा. Recourse is had to लक्ष्यार्थ when the वाच्यार्थ is inapt. The latter should always be connected in some manner with the former. लक्षणा is commonly divided into three kinds:—(i) जहल्लक्षणा where the secondary sense is altogether distinct from the primary, (ii) अजहल्लक्षणा where it includes but is more comprehensive, and (iii) जहदजहल्लक्षणा where it partly includes the वाच्यार्थ and partly excludes it. The last is what is termed भागलक्षणा. See वेदान्त-परिभाषा p. 265.

— . l. 19. वाक्यार्थमशेषतः परित्यज्य—*i. e.* वाच्यार्थमशेषतः परित्यज्य which is a variant reading.

— . l. 26. तत्त्वंपदयोश्श्रूयमाणत्वेन--hence resorting to जहल्लक्षणा would render one of the terms tautologous.

P. 11 l. 5. प्रकारान्तरेण—in the manner described above—other than जहल्लक्षणा and अजहल्लक्षणा.

— . l. 6. उभयलक्षणायाः :—There is nothing logically unsound in this. It is purely a question of which is simpler (B).

— . l. 8. वाक्यं तदर्थो वा...लक्षयति—The लक्षणा really belongs to the thing and not to its name; but may indirectly be ascribed to it also. Hence the alternative statement.

— . l. 14. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि—This अनुभववाक्य, as a महावाक्य, means exactly what तत्त्वमसि, described as उपदेशवाक्य, does. अनुभव=ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार (B).

— . l. 16. अधिकारिणः —Comp : 'अधिकारिणः प्रमितिजनको वेदः'

— . l. 17. अखण्डाकाराकारित=अखण्डाकारगोचर (B).

— . l. 19. अज्ञानमेव बाधते—It is necessary to know the distinction between how the वृत्ति operates ordinarily and how in the case of the अखण्डार्थ. In the former, the अज्ञान of a' jar ' (say) is

removed by the वृत्ति and the चित्प्रतिबिम्ब in it, known as the फल (which for the time being becomes one with the अधिष्ठानचैतन्य or ground-spirit of the jar), reveals the object. In the latter case also, the removal of अज्ञान is brought about by the वृत्ति but the चित् प्रतिबिम्ब is neither required nor competent, being but a reflex, to reveal the ever-luminous (स्वप्रकाश)चैतन्य. This uniqueness pertains to no other thing, all else being जड. On account of this peculiarity, the अन्तःकरण may be said to be useful as well as useless in knowing Brahman. It is required for the removal of अज्ञान but not for manifesting Brahman. Hence the apparently contradictory Upanishadic statements cited in the Text.

P. 12 l. 8. तदपि भासयतीति—' इति शब्दोऽनुभववाक्यार्थनिरूपणसमाप्त्यर्थः (VM)·

— . l. 9. निदिध्यासन—'profound and repeated meditation' from the root ध्यै 'to think '. As regards श्रवणादि mentioned here compare पञ्चदशी; i 53 ff.

— . l. 11. तात्पर्यविचारण—अवधारण should be taken to include विचार also which precedes it.

— — लिङ्गानि—तात्पर्यलिङ्गानि that are stated in the verse already quoted. It should be noted that the first लिङ्ग is उपक्रम and उपसंहार taken together. अपूर्वता--this is necessary in accordance with the view maintained by the Mimamsakas and generally by the Vedantins also, that the scripture teaches only what is extra-empirical and cannot therefore be known through reason and perception—अज्ञातज्ञापकं शास्त्रम्. The identity between Brahman and the जीव is an example of it.

— . l. 20. तदनुष्ठानस्य—ज्ञानानुकूलश्रवणाद्यनुष्ठानस्येत्यर्थः । श्रवणाद्यनुष्ठानस्योपस्थितत्वात् ।।' (B). ' तदनुष्ठानस्येति सगुणविद्याभिप्रायेणोक्तम् ' (VM).

— . l. 21. चिरं-- ' delay', a noun.

— . l. 22. यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथसंपत्स्ये--Note the peculiar use of personal terminations in the verbal forms here. The clause=यावन्न विमोक्ष्यतेऽथसंपत्स्यते. अथ has the force of ' simultaneously ' here. ' आचार्यवान्पुरुषो वेदेति साहचर्यादिहोदाहृतम् । न पुनः फलवचनं तत् ।। ' (VM).

— . l. 23. अर्थवाद--It is praise in this case. It is dispraise in the case of prohibitions like बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्.

— . l. 26. उपपत्ति—This shows that reason is not excluded but is only made to subserve revelation.

— . l. 27. वाचारम्भणं=वागालम्बनं according to शंकर.

P. 13 l. 4. ज्ञातृज्ञानादि—The third is ज्ञेय. The three together are known as the त्रिपुटी.

— l. 8. सकृद्विभातं—'स्वप्रकाशं' (B) 'of uniform luminosity.' 'Once illumined, always illumined'.

— l. 16. तत्सद्भावेत्यादि—In सुषुप्ति the अन्तःकरण is lost in अज्ञान. Hence there can be no अन्तःकरणवृत्ति then. It is different in the case of निर्विकल्पकसमाधि Note there is अविद्यावृत्ति in sleep. See *ante.*

— — दृशिस्वरूपं—ज्ञानस्वरूपं. दृशि stands for the root-meaning —दृशिरूप्रेक्षणे. Comp: the grammarian's maxim :'इक्श्तिपौ धातुनिर्देशे'

— l. 16. यमनियमेत्यादि—Comp: योगसूत्र, ii 29.

— l. 28. कषाय—Note that love and hate are inconceivable in one that has advanced so far in spiritual training. So they stand for रागद्वेषवासना, lingering in the mind from the past.

— l. 29. सविकल्पानन्दास्वादनं—due not to realisation of the self but to the rising above the troubles of life. See S.

— l. 30. समाध्यारम्भसमयेत्यादि—Reluctance at the commencement of indeterminate समाधि to pass beyond the satisfying condition of the determinate.

P. 14 l. 9. संचितकर्म—This is the moral bond; संशय and विपर्यय, the intellectual.

— l. 13. व्युत्थानसमयेत्यादि—This is added in order to show the difference between जीवन्मुक्ति and विदेहमुक्ति.

— — मांसशोणितेत्यादि—The description is intended to evoke revulsion and thus aid the acquisition of वैराग्य.

— l. 14. अशनाया पिपासा—These are strictly features of प्राण as already noticed. They are ascribed to the अन्तःकरण here, apparently under the influence of the सांख्य. See सांख्यकारिका 29.

— l 25. शुभाशुभयोरित्यादि—It suggests complete detachment for the very distinction between the two is transcended. He does not care for either; or, if he does, it is only for the former. Compare "गुणदोषदृशिर्दोषः गुणस्तूभयवर्जितः" भागवत.

P. 15. l. 1. अलंकार—what is good but not essential. Virtues like humility and kindness become a second nature to him.

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TRANSLATION.

For the fulfilment of my desire I resort to the Self, the ground of all, the partless—Being, Thought and Bliss—which is beyond the range of both speech and mind.

Having adored (my) revered preceptor who, because he has reached beyond the notion of diversity, is (not only in name but) also in fact, ADVAYANANDA, I shall set forth, to the best of my understanding, the essence of the Vedanta.

(The term) 'Vedanta' signifies the Upanishads, the means of right knowledge (in respect of the Self), the *Śārīraka-sūtras* and other (works) helpful in (understanding) them. As the present (work) is (but) a manual of the Vedanta, it has for its *anubandhas* or 'preliminary considerations' the same as that (system) and they do not therefore need to be separately ascertained. Now the preliminary considerations are the *adhikārin* or 'person qualified to study', *viṣaya* or 'theme', *sambandha* or 'mutual relation' and *prayojana* or 'end to be attained (by the study)'. Of these, the *adhikārin* is an inquirer who, by reason of his formal study of the Vedas and the Vedaṅgas, has attained to a general knowledge of what all the Vedas teach; who has his mind well purified through the cleansing, in this or in a previous life, of all sin by abstaining from the *kāmya* or 'optional' and *niṣiddha* or 'forbidden' acts and by the performance of *nitya* or 'obligatory' and *naimittika* or 'occasional' rites, *prāyascittas* or 'purificatory ceremonies' and *upāsanas* or 'meditations'; and who is equipped with the four-fold aid. The optional rites like the *jyotiṣtoma* are the means of procuring desired ends like heaven; the forbidden ones, like slaying a Brāhmaṇa, bring about unwelcome results such as hell. The obligatory deeds, like the morning and evening prayers, are such as result in sin when not performed, and the occasional ones, like the *jāteṣti*, are those that are rendered necessary by events like the birth of a son. Purificatory ceremonies, like the *cāndrāyaṇa*, are the means of destroying sin. Meditations, like the *Śāndilya-vidyā*, are mental exercises directed towards the phenomenal Brahman. The final aim of these obligatory deeds and the like is the purification of the heart as taught in scriptural texts like 'Such Self, Brāhmaṇas desire to understand through Vedic study, sacrifice, etc.' and in traditional codes like, 'One destroys one's sin through penance'.

The (common) aim of all meditations, on the other hand, is concentration of the mind. The incidental advantage of obligatory and occasional rites and that of meditations are (respectively) the attainment of the world of the fathers and the world of Brahmā, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'From *karma* (is reached) the world of the fathers; from meditation, the world of the gods.' The preliminary equipment (consists) of discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, detachment from (desire for) enjoyment here or hereafter, acquisition of the group of six, beginning with *śama* or 'equanimity', and the desire for release (from *samsāra*). The first of these is discerning that Brahman alone is eternal and all else, non-eternal; **[Page 2]** the second, entire desistence from the enjoyment of worldly objects like garlands, scents, etc., and of heavenly things like nectar, since the latter, like the former, being effected, must necessarily be evanescent; the third (consists of) what are termed *śama*, *dama*, *uparati*, *titikṣā*, *samādhāna* and *śraddhā*. Of these, *śama* is restraining the mind from things other than the study (of Vedanta) etc.; *dama* is turning back the external senses from things other than the same; *uparati*, (continued) abstention from what is other than such (study) when they are thus withdrawn; or (it may be) formal renunciation of prescribed acts; *titikṣā* is the ability to bear the pairs of opposites like heat and cold; *samādhāna* is focussing the mind, (thus) brought under control, on the study (of the Vedanta) and matters subsidiary to it; and *śraddhā* is faith in the teachings of Vedanta as expounded by the teacher. *Mumukṣutva* is desire for release (from *saṁsāra*). An inquirer of this description is the person qualified to study (Vedanta) according to the scriptural text: 'Calm, subdued, etc.' The same has been stated (elsewhere) also: 'This (teaching) is to be imparted (only) to one that is of peaceful mind and of subdued senses; that is free from sin and devoted to his duties; that possesses virtuous qualities, has long and continually been a follower and is a seeker after release.'

The theme to be expounded is the identity between Brahman and the individual self—the pure spirit, that alone being the final import of the Upanishads. The *saṁbandha* or 'relation' is that of what is to be made known to the means of making it known—existing between such identity and the Upanishads which rightly propound it. The *prayojana* or aim is the dispelling of ignorance in respect of that identity and the attainment of bliss which is of the nature of one's own self, according to the scriptural texts: 'A knower of the Self passes beyond sorrow' and 'He that knows Brahman, becomes Brahman itself.'

As one with a blazing head might (run to) a reservoir of water, so a person thus qualified, tormented by the fire of worldly existence (characterised by) births, deaths, etc., approaches, with an offering in his hand, a *guru*—well-versed in the scriptures and devoted to Brahman—and becomes his follower as stated in the scriptural text: '(He resorts to), with fuel in hand, one that is proficient in the scriptures and is devoted to Brahman.' (And) the latter, through supreme compassion, instructs him according to the method of *adhyāropa* ('superposition') and *apavāda* ('negation'), as stated in the scriptural text: 'To him that has sought him, he, the knower, explains, etc.'

Adhyāropa is superimposing upon Reality what is not real, as for example the 'serpent' on a 'rope' which is not a serpent. The Reality is Brahman which is Being, Thought, Bliss, one without a second. The not-real is the aggregate of all insentient things beginning with *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna*, they say, is a positive something which can be expressed neither as 'is' nor as 'is not', is of the nature of the three *guṇas*, and is the opposite of *jñāna* or 'right knowledge', on the basis of experience such as 'I am ignorant' and of scriptural texts like 'God's own power, hidden by its *guṇas*, etc.' **[Page 3]** This *ajñāna* is spoken of as one and as many according as it is viewed collectively or distributively. Thus as trees viewed collectively are designated as one, *viz.*, a 'forest'; or as drops of water viewed collectively, as one, *viz.*, a 'reservoir'; so the *ajñānas* of individual selves, appearing as many, are when viewed collectively spoken of as one, after the manner of scriptural texts like 'Unborn, one, etc.' This collective (*ajñāna*) being the adjunct of the Highest, is characterised by the predominance of radiant *sattva*. Spirit, as conditioned by it, since it illumines *all ajñānas*, has the characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence, universal control, etc., and is termed the unmanifest, the inner guide, the cause of the world and the Almighty, on the authority of scriptural texts like 'Who knows all, who knows everything, etc.' This collective (*ajñāna*) is, with respect to *Īśvara*, described as the causal body, for it is the source of all; as the sheath of bliss, for it abounds in joy and envelops Him like a sheath; and as deep sleep, for everything gets merged in it. On account of (the last reason) it is stated to be the place of dissolution of both the gross and the subtle universe. As a forest when viewed in parts is described as many, *viz.*, trees; or as a reservoir, when viewed in parts, is described as many, *viz.*, drops of water; so *ajnāna* when viewed individually is spoken of as many after the manner of scriptural texts—like 'Indra goes about in varied form by means of his *Māyās*.' Their designation here as

vyaṣṭi and *samaṣṭi* is because they *pervade* one and many respectively. This individual (*ajñāna*), being the adjunct of the lowest, is characterised by the predominance of clouded *sattva*. Spirit as conditioned by it, since it manifests only a single *ajñāna*, is characterised by limited knowledge, impotence and so forth and is termed *Prājña*. Its being a *Prājña* is due to its imperfect light, the result of its obscuring adjunct. With respect to it, this *ajñāna* is described as the causal body, for it is the source of the internal organ, etc.; as the sheath of bliss, for it abounds in joy and envelops it like a sheath; and as deep sleep, for everything gets merged in it. On account of (the last reason) it is regarded as the place of dissolution of the gross and subtle bodies. Then both *Īśvara* and *Prājña* experience joy through subtle modifications of *ajñāna*, illumined by spirit, in accordance with the scripture: '*Prājña*, the enjoyer of bliss, the ante-chamber of mind, etc.,' and as evidenced by the reminiscent experience of waking: 'I slept happily and knew nothing.' There is no distinction between these two, *viz.*, collective and individual (*ajñāna*), as (there is none) between a forest and the trees (in it) or a reservoir and the water-drops (in it). Neither is there any distinction between *Īśvara* and *Prājña*, which are respectively conditioned by them, as (there is none) between space occupied by a forest and by a tree or space as reflected in a reservoir and in a water-drop, as taught in scriptural texts like 'He is the all-controller, etc.' Like unconditioned space which forms the ground of a forest and a tree as also of the space limited by them, or of a reservoir and a drop of water (in it) as also of the space reflected in them, is the unconditioned ground of these two, *viz.*, *ajñāna* and spirit as conditioned by it. It is known as the Fourth, as stated in the scripture 'As auspicious, non-dual and the fourth, they view (it)'. This same Fourth which is pure sentience, **[Page 4]** not distinguished—as in the case of a glowing iron-ball—from *ajñāna*, etc., and spirit as conditioned by them, is what is said to be *expressed* by the 'great saying'; and when distinguished, it (is said to be) *implied* by it.

This *ajñāna* has two powers named *āvaraṇa* ('the obscuring'), and *vikṣepa* ('the diversifying'). As regards the obscuring power: just as a cloud though small appears to envelop the sun's disc, many leagues in extent, hiding it from the sight of the observer, so *ajñāna*, though finite, seems to envelop the Self which is infinite and not subject to transmigration, hiding it from the mind of the experient. Such is (its) power. So has it been stated: 'As an ignorant person, because his sight is intercepted by a cloud, believes that the sun is lustreless when it is only hidden by the cloud;

so, that which to the deluded appears as bound—that very Self am I, always of the nature of experience.' The conditioning of the Self by this obscuring power explains its feeling that it is an agent, an enjoyer and that it is characterised by empirical existence with its pains, pleasures and delusions which are all in reality as good as non-existent—like the serpent-hood in a rope when it is obscured by the ignorance that it is a rope. Now as regards the diversifying power: just as ignorance of a rope (say), through its power, gives rise to the appearance of a serpent in the rope it conceals; so *ajñāna*, through its diversifying power, gives rise in the Self obscured by it to the appearance of the universe beginning with space. Such is (its) power. So has it been stated: 'The diversifying power can give rise to the universe from the subtle body right up to the universe.' Spirit, conditioned by *ajñāna* with its two powers, taken mainly by itself is the efficient cause; and the condition taken mainly by itself is the material cause—as a spider, with respect to the web (it) weaves, is, considered by itself mainly, the efficient cause and, considered mainly in its bodily aspect, the material cause. As stated in texts like 'Space sprang into being from this Self, etc.' space comes into being from spirit as conditioned by *ajñāna* in its diversifying phase with *tamas* preponderating; from space, air; from air, fire; from fire, water; and from water, earth. Since inertness preponderates in them, *tamas* (is assumed to) predominate in their cause. Then *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* according to the principle of causation, appear in space, etc. These very (things) are termed the 'subtle' elements, *tanmātras* and non-quintuplicated elements. From these spring into being (all) subtle bodies as well as the gross elements.

The subtle bodies are the *liṅga-śarīras* consisting of seventeen factors. These factors are the five organs of knowledge, *buddhi*, *manas*, the five organs of action and the five vital airs. The organs of knowledge are those known as the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. These spring respectively and in order from the *sattva* aspects (of the elements) like space, taken singly. *Buddhi* is [Page 5] that mode of the internal organ which stands for certitude; *manas* is that mode of the internal organ which stands for desire and doubt; *citta* and *ahaṁkāra* (which are sometimes reckoned separately) are to be included in these two. These spring into existence from the *sattva* aspects (of the elements) such as space, taken all together. Since (all) these are of a luminous nature, they are (regarded as) the effects of the *sattva* aspects. The *buddhi* along with the organs of knowing constitutes the 'sheath of self-consciousness'. It is what is termed

वृत्तिः

the empirical self and migrates from this world to the other, fancying itself as the agent and the enjoyer, as happy or miserable and so forth. When *manas* on the other hand is taken with the (same) organs of knowing, it constitutes the 'sheath of consciousness'. The organs of action are those known as the tongue, the hands, feet, the anus and the generating organ. These, however, come into being in order from the *rajas* aspects (of the elements) such as space, taken separately. The (five) vital airs are *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. *Prāṇa* which (literally) means 'going forward' is at the tip of the nose; *apāna* which means 'going down' is in the anus, etc., *vyāna* which means 'going in all directions' is everywhere in the body; *udāna* which means 'going upward' is in the throat as the departing breath; *samāna* is in the interior of the body and *equalizes* what is eaten or drunk. Some are of opinion that there are five other 'airs' named '*nāga*', '*kūrma*', '*kṛkala*', '*devadatta*' and '*dhanañjaya*'. Of them, *nāga* is what gives rise to eructation; *kūrma*, what brings about the (shutting and) opening of the eyes; *kṛkala*, what causes yawning; and *dhanañjaya*, what causes fatness. Others (are of opinion) that *prāṇa* and the rest are the only five (airs) since the other five can be included in them. This group of the five airs—*prāṇa* and so forth—comes into being from the *rajas* phase of the elements, such as space, taken all together. This group of five together with the organs of action constitutes the 'sheath of vitality'. It is conceived as emerging from the *rajas* aspects (of the elements) since it is characterised by activity. Of these sheaths, that characterised by self-consciousness is the agent, that characterised by consciousness is the instrument and that characterised by energy is of the nature of action. They say that this kind of distribution of function is in accordance with their respective capacity. These three sheaths are together designated the subtle body.

Here also all the subtle bodies, viewed as one, form an aggregate like a forest or a reservoir; and, viewed severally, are also individuals like a tree or a water-drop. Spirit, as conditioned by this aggregate, is termed *Sūtrātman* because it *runs through* all; *Hiraṇya-garbha*, because of its power of knowing and desiring; and *Prāṇa*, because of its power of acting. This *samaṣṭi* belonging to it, *viz.*, the triple sheath beginning with the sheath of self-consciousness, being subtler than the gross universe, is termed its subtle body, and as its dream-state, retaining as it does, the impressions of the waking state. It is on account of (the last reason) described as the place of dissolution of the gross world. Spirit as delimited by the corresponding *vyaṣṭi* is the

Taijasa since it has for its adjunct the internal organ in which 'fire' predominates [**Page 6**]. In its case also, the *vyaṣṭi viz.*, the triple sheath, beginning with the sheath of self-consciousness, is termed the subtle body because it is subtler than the gross body, and the dream-state, because it retains the impressions of the waking state. It is, on account of (the last reason), described also as the place of dissolution of the gross body. Both the *Sūtrātman* and the *Taijasa* then experience subtle objects through modes of *manas* as stated in scriptural texts like 'Enjoying the subtle is the *Taijasa*'. Here also, between the aggregate and the individual (adjuncts) as well as between the *Sūtrātman* and the *Taijasa*, delimited by them respectively, there is no distinction, as (there is none) between a forest and a tree, and the space limited by either; or between a reservoir and a drop of water, and the space reflected in either. This is how the subtle body is produced.

The gross elements are those that are quintuplicated. 'Quintuplication' means dividing each of the elements beginning with space into two equal parts, then sub-dividing each of the first five of the ten halves into four equal parts and combining those fourth parts (one each) with the remaining halves, excepting only the second half of its own kind. So has it been stated: 'Dividing each into two, then the first (half) into four and combining each with the remaining halves other than the one of its kind give the five-fold five.' It must not be thought that there is no authority for this (quintuplication), for the scripture (when it teaches) triple combination implies the five-fold combination also. Though each (gross element) is alike made up of all the five, it is justifiable to designate them as (merely) *ākāśa*, etc., according to the principle (of the *sūtra*), 'Such designation—such designation is due to preponderance'. At that stage, sound manifests itself in *ākāśa*; sound and touch, in air; sound, touch and colour, in fire; sound, touch, colour and taste, in water; and sound, touch, colour, taste and odour, in earth. From quintuplicated (elements) arise the worlds that are farther and farther above—*bhūr, bhuvar, svar, mahar, janas, tapas* and *satya*; the worlds that are farther and farther beneath, *atala, vitala, sutala, rasātala, talātala, mahātala* and *pātāla*; and the cosmic egg, the four varieties of gross bodies in it as well as the food, drink and so forth suited to them. The four varieties of bodies are *jarāyuja, aṇḍaja, udbhijja* and *svedaja*. (Of these) the first are born of the placenta like man and beast; the second are born of eggs like birds and reptiles; the third break through the earth like brambles and trees; and the fourth are born of sweat like lice and mosquitoes.

Here also all gross bodies of the four kinds conceived as one and many respectively constitute an aggregate like a forest or a reservoir and individuals like a tree or a drop of water. Spirit, as delimited by this aggregate, is designated *Vaiśvānara*, because of its attachment for all people; and *Virāj*, because of its appearance in a diverse manner. This *samaṣṭi* belonging to it is its gross body. **[Page 7.]** It is described as the sheath of food, because it is a transformation of food (matter); as the gross body, for it serves as the seat for the enjoyment of gross objects; and also as waking. Spirit, as defined by the corresponding *vyaṣṭi*, is termed *Viśva*, since it has *entered* into the gross body, etc., without abandoning its attachment for the subtle body. Of it similarly is this *vyaṣṭi*, the gross body; it is described as the sheath of food for the same reason, *viz.*, of its being produced from food; and also as waking. In that state these—*Viśva* and *Vaiśvānara*—through the five senses beginning with the ear, controlled by *Dik*, Wind, the Sun, *Varuṇa* and the *Asvins* respectively experience sound, touch, colour, taste and odour; through the five senses of action commencing with that of speech, controlled by Fire, Indra, Upendra, Yama and Prajāpati, respectively carry on speaking, grasping, moving, excreting and enjoying; through the fourfold internal organ, *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *citta*, controlled respectively by the Moon, the Creator, Śaṁkara and Viṣṇu, carry on resolving, deciding, 'I-making' and recollecting—the objects of all these being of a concrete kind. (This is all) in accordance with scriptural texts like 'Abiding in the waking state, conscious of the external, etc.' Here also, there is no distinction between the gross *samaṣṭi* and *vyaṣṭi* as well as between spirit as delimited by either; as there is none between the forest and a tree, and the space as delimited by either; or between a reservoir and a drop of water, and the space as reflected in either. Thus is produced the gross universe from the quintuplicated elements.

The aggregate of these gross, subtle and causal universes is a single big universe as the aggregate of subordinate forests is a big forest or as the collection of minor reservoirs is a big reservoir. Spirit as conditioned by these—from *Vaiśvānara* to *Īśvara*—is also one only like space limited by the minor forests or space reflected in the smaller reservoirs. Spirit which (in itself) is unconditioned when not distinguished, as in the case of a glowing iron-ball, from this big universe and spirit conditioned by it, is what is said to be the *expressed* meaning of the statement: 'All this indeed is Brahman'; and when distinguished, it (is said to be) *implied* by it. Thus

has been explained in general the superposition of what is not real upon what is.

It will now be stated in detail who superposes what on the internal self. The too, too simple-minded says that the son is the self because there are scriptural statements like 'Oneself verily is born as the son'; because the son is as dear as oneself; and also because when the son prospers or suffers, one feels oneself does prosper or suffer. The *Cārvāka*, on the other hand, says that the gross (material) body is the self, because there are scriptural statements like 'That verily is this self which is made of the essence of food'; because a person is seen to flee from a house on fire even leaving his son behind; and also because of direct experience like 'I am stout', 'I am lean'. A second (type of) *Cārvāka* says that the senses are the self because there are scriptural statements like 'Those senses indeed came to father Prajāpati and said, etc.'; because in the absence of (the functioning of) the senses, the body ceases to move; and also because of direct experience such as 'I am blind', 'I am deaf'. **[Page 8.]** A third (type of) *Cārvāka* says that the vital principle is the self because of scriptural texts like 'Another and yet deeper self is the sheath of life, etc.'; because of the non-functioning of the senses when life departs; and also because of direct experience such as 'I am hungry', 'I am thirsty'. A fourth (type of) *Cārvāka* says that *manas* is the self because of scriptural statements like 'Another and yet deeper self is the sheath of *manas*, etc.'; because of the absence of life when *manas* becomes quiescent; and also because of direct experience such as 'I desire', 'I doubt'. The Buddhist again says that the *buddhi* is the self because of scriptural texts like, 'Another and yet deeper self is the sheath of *vijñāna*, etc.'; because no instrument can function without an agent (to guide it); and also because of direct experience such as 'I act', 'I enjoy'. The followers of Prabhākara and the Naiyāyikas say that the non-sentient is the self because there are scriptural texts like 'Another and yet deeper self is the sheath of bliss, etc.'; because *buddhi* and similar qualities are seen to merge in the non-sentient; and also because there is direct experience such as 'I am ignorant', 'I am conscious'. The followers of Bhaṭṭa again say that spirit, associated with nescience, is the self because there are scriptural texts like 'Solely the essence of consciousness and abounding in bliss'; because there is consciousness as well as unconsciousness in deep sleep; and also because there is the direct experience 'I do not know myself'. Another (type of) Buddhist says that the void is the self, because there are scriptural statements like 'This was only non-being at first, etc.';

because there is nought in deep sleep; and also because of the feeling 'I *was not* while asleep', which is reminiscent of the self's non-being (then).

It will (now) be shown how these (superpositions) beginning with the son are not the self. That the son, etc., are not the self is clear from the fact that among the misleading scriptural quotations, fallacious reasonings and erroneous experiences mentioned by the simple-minded and the rest, the earlier one—whether text, reasoning or experience—is seen to be untenable by the later one—whether text, reasoning or experience. Moreover, all these, beginning with the son and ending with the void, must be other than the self because of oppos tion to weightier texts like 'the internal', 'not stout', 'not the eye', 'not life', 'lacking *manas*', 'not an agent', 'spirit', 'spirit alone', and 'being' etc.; because of the transient nature of the son and the rest up to the void, which like a 'jar', are insentient and therefore depend for their revelation on spirit; and also because of the force of the knower's experience—'I am Brahman', conflicting respectively with the cited texts, reasonings, and forms of experience. Hence the experience of the learned in the Vedanta is that the inmost self is spirit alone which reveals these several things and which, in its essential nature, is eternal, pure, intelligent, free and true. Such (is the nature of) superposition.

Apavāda means (the instruction) that the universe beginning with *ajñāna* which is not real and which is an appearance of Reality is nothing but that Reality, as the (illusory) serpent which is not real and which is the appearance of a rope is nothing but the rope. So has it been stated: '(When a thing) actually appears as another, it is called *vikāra*; when (it) falsely appears as another, it is called *vivarta*.' Thus all the seats of experience—the aggregate of all the four-fold gross bodies, **[Page 9]** the objects to be experienced such as food and drink, their abode, *viz.*, the fourteen worlds beginning with *bhūr* and their abode the cosmic egg—all this is nothing but its source, *viz.*, the five quintuplicated elements. The five quintuplicated elements together with sound, etc.—the objects of sense—the aggregate of all the subtle bodies—all this is but its source, *viz.*, the five rudimentary elements. These rudimentary elements together with (their constituent) *sattva*, etc., are but spirit, conditioned by *ajñāna*, when traced back in the reverse order to their origination. This *ajñāna* and spirit conditioned by *ajñāna* such as *Īśvara*, are (really) their ground, *viz.*, the mere unconditioned Brahman, the Fourth.

By such superposition and (subsequent) negation, the clarifica-

tion of the conceptions of *Tat* and *Tvam* may also be effected. Thus the aggregate of *ajñāna*, etc., spirit conditioned by *ajñāna* and characterised by omniscience etc., the unconditioned spirit—when these three appear undistinguished as one—like a glowing iron-ball—we have the primary or explicit sense of *Tat*. The unconditioned spirit which is the ground of the condition as well as of the conditioned is the secondary or implied sense of *Tat*. The corresponding *vyaṣṭi* such as *ajñāna* and spirit conditioned by it, characterised by limited knowledge, etc., and spirit unconditioned—these three appearing together as one—like a glowing iron-ball—constitute the primary or explicit sense of *Tvam*. The unconditioned spirit which is the ground of the condition as well as of the conditioned, which is internal and of the nature of bliss, the Fourth, is the secondary or implied sense of *Tvam*.

Now the import of the 'great saying' will be explained. The proposition 'That thou art' signifies the partless ultimate when viewed under three relations. The three relations are that of apposition between the terms, that of substance and attribute between the things denoted by these terms and that of the implied and the implying between the deeper self and what is denoted (by the two terms). So has it been stated: 'Apposition, the relation of substance and attribute, and the relation of the implied and implying—respectively between the terms, their meanings and the inmost self.' (Of these,) the appositional relation is as in 'That is this Devadatta' where 'that' signifying Devadatta as related to past time, and 'this' signifying Devadatta as related to present time are (both) intended to refer to one and the same individual. So also in the case of the present proposition 'That thou art', (it is) the intended reference to one and the same spirit in 'that', signifying spirit characterised by mediacy, etc., and in 'thou', signifying spirit characterised by immediacy, etc. As regards the relation of substance and attribute: As in the same proposition the relation of substance and attribute is between Devadatta as related to past time which is the (primary) meaning of 'that' and Devadatta as related to present time which is the (primary) meaning of 'this', excluding the difference between the two; so in this proposition, the relation of substance and attribute is between spirit characterised by mediacy, etc., which is the (primary) sense of *Tat* and spirit characterised by immediacy, etc., which is the (primary) sense of *Tvam*, **[Page 10]** excluding the difference between the two. As regards the relation of the implied and the implying: As in the same case, the relation of the implied and the implying is between the words, 'that' and 'this' or between their meanings and the identical

Devadatta, divested of conflicting attributes *viz.*, being related to past and present time; so in the present proposition also the relation of the implied and the implying is between the terms *Tat* and *Tvam* or their meanings and the identical spirit, divested of conflicting attributes such as mediacy and immediacy, etc. This is what is known as 'partial indication'.

The manner of interpreting 'The lotus is blue' does not suit this proposition. In that case, the (ordinary) interpretation is all right, because it does not contradict (what is known through) any other *pramāṇa*, whether we take the import as the relation between substance and attribute *viz.*, the quality of blue denoted by the word *nīla* and the substance of lotus denoted by the word *utpala*, excluding in the one case qualities like whiteness and in the other, substances like cloth; or as the unity of the two as substance and attribute with either as attributive; or as an identity (of the qualified). Here, on the other hand, such an interpretation does not fit in, because it leads to conflict with (what is known through) other *pramāṇas* such as perception, whether we take it as signifying a relation as substance and attribute of spirit characterised by mediacy etc., which is the (primary) meaning of *Tat* and spirit as characterised by immediacy etc., which is the (primary) meaning of *Tvam*, excluding the distinctive features; or as the unity of the two as substance and quality with either as attributive; or as an identity (of the qualified). The same has been stated (thus)—' The import in the present case is neither an identity nor a relating of the distinct; the import accepted by those well-versed (in the Vedanta) is the partless ultimate.'

Nor will (the interpretation) by total abandonment of the primary sense, adopted in the case of ' The hamlet is in the Ganges' suit here. There the total abandonment of the primary meaning for understanding the ' bank '—connected with it—as the implied one, is proper, since the literal meaning (of the judgment) *viz.*, the hamlet being *in* the Ganges, is altogether discrepant (with experience); so it is wholly given up. Here, on the other hand, as the import of the proposition, *viz.*, identity between spirit characterised by mediacy etc., and spirit characterised by immediacy etc., is only in partial conflict, it is not proper to reject the remaining part also and understand an altogether different thing as implied, having recourse to the (principle of) total abandonment of the primary sense. Nor can it be said: ' As the word *Gangā* dropping its primary sense, denotes the " bank ", so let either *Tat* or *Tvam* here, by dropping its primary sense wholly, denote the *Tvam*-or the *Tat-padārtha*. Why then is it not proper

to resort to the method of total abandonment ?' For in the one case, because no word (like) *tīra* is found and the corresponding thing is not thought of, there is, no doubt, need for taking it as implied ; but in the other, since both the words *Tat* and *Tvam* are found and their meanings are known, there is no need for taking either as implying what is (directly) signified by the other.

The interpretation (on the principle) of not abandoning any part of the (primary) meaning in selecting the implied one, will not do in this case as in 'The red (horse) runs'. There the principle of not abandoning the primary sense will fit in, inasmuch as the (literal) sense of the proposition, *viz.*, the quality of redness running, is self-discrepant and the discrepancy is removed by understanding from the word 'red', without excluding its primary sense, a horse or some such thing to which redness belongs. [Page 11] Here, on the other hand, the principle of seeking for an implied meaning without dropping the primary, will not at all suit inasmuch as the (literal) sense of the sentence, *viz.*, identity between spirit characterised by mediacy and spirit characterised by immediacy etc., is self-discrepant and the discrepancy cannot be removed by understanding from the words anything whatsoever which does not exclude their explicit sense. Nor can it be said 'Let either the word *Tat* or the word *Tvam*, discarding what is discrepant in its meaning, secondarily signify the meaning of *Tvam* or *Tat* including what is left of its own. Where then is any need to have recourse to the adoption of (the method of) partial indication ?' (For) one and the same word cannot secondarily indicate both a part of its own meaning and that of another. Moreover, when a different word (explicitly) signifies that meaning, there is no necessity for understanding the same indirectly (from a second word).

Therefore just as the proposition 'That is this Devadatta' or its (explicit) meaning, because it involves a partial contradiction of Devadatta as related to past time being identified with Devadatta as related to present time, signifies secondarily the person-in-himself involving no contradiction—the contradictory features having been dropped ; so the proposition 'That art thou' or its (explicit) import, because it involves a partial contradiction of spirit characterised by mediacy etc., being identified with spirit characterised by immediacy etc., secondarily signifies the partless spirit which involves no contradiction—the contradictory elements having been dropped.

Now will be explained the meaning of 'I am Brahman' which gives (expression to) the experience (of the disciple). When one

has been taught in the above manner by the preceptor through the (great) saying that its meaning is the partless ultimate, after the 'that'-entity and the 'thou'-entity have been clarified by adopting the method of superposition and negation, there will arise (in him), if he be fully qualified, the following state of consciousness, having for its content the partless Brahman,—'I am Brahman whose nature is eternal, pure, intelligent, free, true, which is supreme bliss and which is infinite, without a second'. That (mental state), inspired by the reflection of spirit, refers to the supreme Brahman as not distinct from the *Jīva*, and removes only the ignorance obscuring it. Then, as when the threads constituting a piece of cloth are burnt, the cloth itself is burnt; so, since ignorance, the cause of all, is removed, all the effects arising from it will disappear and the mental state also, as falling within that (sphere), will be destroyed. Spirit as reflected in it, being unable to illumine the self-luminous Brahman, not distinct from the internal self, will be overcome as a lamp-flame for example is, by the sun's rays, being unable to overcome them. And it will lapse into Brahman itself, not distinct from the inmost self, as its condition *viz.*, the mental state is no longer there—as the reflection of a (person's) face, when the mirror conditioning it is broken, lapses into the face. Accordingly there is no contradiction between scriptural statements like 'By the *manas* alone is it to be seen' and those like 'What by the *manas* cannot be known, etc.', it being admitted that (Brahman) is within the range of the *vṛtti* and it being denied (at the same time) that it comes within the range of its *phala*. Thus has it been stated :—'The exponents of the *śāstra* have denied only its being affected by the *phala*'. Its being affected by the *vṛtti* is necessary in order that ignorance may be dispelled.' Also : 'The reflexion serves no purpose (here), Brahman being self-luminous.' **[Page 12.]** The *vṛtti* when it comprehends a non-spiritual object behaves differently : The *vṛtti* whose form is 'This is a jar' has for its object the hitherto unknown jar ; it first dispels the ignorance in respect of it and then, through the reflection of spirit in it, manifests the jar. So has it been stated : 'The (state of the) internal organ as well as the reflection of spirit in it, both comprehend the jar. Of them, the state dispels the ignorance ; and the jar is made known by the reflection'—as the rays of a lamp reaching a jar or a piece of cloth enveloped in darkness first dispel the darkness and then reveal it by their light.

Since it is necessary to carry on *śravaṇa* ('study'), *manana* ('reflexion'), *nididhyāsana* ('meditation'), and *samādhi* ('absorption') until the realization of spirit which is of the essence of oneself ; they also are set forth (here). By *śravaṇa* is meant the

ascertainment, aided by the six-fold indication, that the final purport of all the Upanishads is (the sole reality of) the secondless Brahman. The indications are—*upakramopasaṁhārau* ('beginning and end'), *abhyāsa* ('repeated declaration'), *apurvatā* ('novelty'), *phalam* ('use'), *artha-vāda* ('glorification'), *upapatti* ('reasoning'). By *upakramopasaṁhārau* is meant the mention, in the beginning as well as in the end, of the topic treated of in the section. Thus in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya-Upanishad*, the subject to be taught, *viz.*, the secondless Brahman is mentioned in the beginning in the words, 'One only without a second' and also in the end in the words, 'All this is of the essence of it'. *Abhyāsa* is the statement now and again, in the course of a section, of the matter to be taught in it. Thus (we find) in the same (case) the reference nine times, during the course of the chapter, to the secondless Reality, in the words, 'That thou art'. *Apūrvatā* means the unknowability through the other *pramāṇas* of the subject taught in the section. Thus (we have) in the same (case), the incomprehensibility through the other *pramaṇās* of the secondless Brahman, the subject to be taught. *Phalam* means the usefulness referred to here and there of the knowledge of the matter taught or of its practice. Thus in the same (case) there is, as the result of knowing the secondless Brahman, mention of its attainment, in 'He knows who has a preceptor; for him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body), and then he becomes one (with Brahman)'. By *artha-vāda* is meant the frequent commendation of the subject-matter taught. In the same case as above, there is the extolling of the secondless Brahman in 'Did you ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unknown becomes known, the un-understood becomes understood?' *Upapatti* is (analogical) reasoning stated now and then in order to establish the truth of the matter taught. To take the same (case once again), that all transformations are verbal in character is adduced as the reason in support (of the sole reality) of Brahman in 'O gentle Sir, just as by means of a single lump of clay, all (things) earthen are known, (all) transformations are verbal and therefore are only name; earth alone is real.' *Manana* is **[Page 13]** constant reflection, with the aid of reasoning subserving the teaching of the Upanishads, upon the secondless Reality known through study. *Nididhyāsana* is the procession of like thoughts referring to the secondless Brahman—dissociated from thoughts of other objects like the body and so forth. *Samādhi* is two-fold—determinate and indeterminate. Of them, the determinate signifies the resting on the secondless Brahman of

the mind which has assumed its form, but without losing sight of the distinction between knower, known, etc. Then, though diversity may continue to be seen, the secondless Reality manifests itself—as in seeing an earthen toy-elephant, the (fact of its being mere) earth is also realized. So has it been stated by those that know: 'What is of the nature of awareness, like unto space, supreme, always gleaming alike, unborn, one, imperishable, untouched (by evil or good), all-pervading and secondless—that Brahman am I and have ever been free.' The indeterminate, on the other hand, signifies the resting in an intense manner on the secondless Brahman of the mind which has assumed that form—transcending the distinction of knower, known, etc. Then the secondless Brahman alone appears, without the mental state referring to it, as water alone is perceived and not salt also (dissolved in it, because) it has assumed the form of water. Hence there can arise no doubt that this condition and dreamless sleep are the same. Though in both alike the *vṛtti* is not revealed, they differ in that it is present in the one but not in the other. Its pre-requisites are *yama* ('restraint'), *niyama* ('observance'), *āsana* ('posture'), *prāṇāyāma* ('regulation of breath'), *pratyāhāra* ('abstraction'), *dhāraṇā* ('fixity'), *dhyāna* ('contemplation') and *samādhi* ('trance'). Of these *yama* (stands for) non-injury, truthfulness, abstention from stealing, celibacy and poverty; *niyama*, (for) cleanliness, contentment, self-discipline or penance, scriptural recitation and service of God; *āsana*, (for) dispositions of hands, feet, etc., in specific ways such as *padma*, *svastika* and so forth; *prāṇāyama*, (for) modes of controlling breath, *viz.*, measured exhaling, inhaling and suspending (it); *pratyāhāra*, (for) withdrawal of the senses from their respective objects; *dhāraṇa*, (for) fixing the internal organ on the secondless Reality; *dhyāna*, (for) the process, now and again interrupted, of fixing the mental state on the secondless Reality. As regards *samādhi*, it has already been described and it is the determinate (variety) that is meant here. There may be four obstacles in the way of indeterminate *samādhi* which is the goal of this (discipline), *viz.*, *laya* ('lapse'), *vikṣepa* ('distraction'), *kaṣāya*, ('passion') and *rasāsvāda* ('satisfaction'). Of them, *laya* is the lapsing into sleep of the mind without resting on the partless ultimate; *vikṣepa*, the dwelling of the mind on something other than the secondless Reality; *kaṣāya*, not resting on the partless Reality owing to the mental state becoming suspended, through the bias of former attachment and so forth, though there be no 'lapse' or 'distraction'; and *rasāsvāda*, the tasting of satisfaction in determinate *samādhi* by the mind even when it is

not resting on the partless ultimate; or it may be the tasting of satisfaction at the commencement of (indeterminate) *samādhi*. [Page 14] When undisturbed by this four-fold obstacle, the mind becomes motionless like a lamp-flame in a windless place and rests concentred on the partless spirit—that is termed indeterminate *samādhi* or 'absorption'. Thus has it been said: 'The mind should be wakened, if there be a lapse; it should be calmed, if distracted; if soiled by passion, the fact should (at once) be realized; if (haply) it attains equanimity, it should not be disturbed. Nor should one taste the pleasure thereof but should remain detached and alert.' Also, 'As a lamp-flame in a windless place does not flicker—that is said to be its like.'

Now will be described the characteristics of a *Jīvan-mukta*. A person called a *Jīvan-mukta* is one that rests in Brahman, freed from all bondage, because he has realized his own essence as the partless Brahman through the dispelling of ignorance in regard to it; and because of the destruction, as a result of it, of *ajñāna* and its effects such as accumulated *karma*, doubt, illusion and so forth, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'The heart's knots are untied; all doubts disappear; his *karmas* also perish, when what is both cause and effect is seen.' Such a person, however, when he is not in a trance, though witnessing the activities engaged in by the body which is a conglomerate of flesh, blood, urine, fæces, etc., by the aggregate of the senses which may be the victims of blunders, dimness, inactivity, etc., and by the internal organ, the source of hunger, thirst, sorrow, delusion, etc.; and experiencing their results—not incompatible with right knowledge—does not in truth see them; for (he knows) they are no longer true—as a person who knows that it is (all) magic does not believe in the magical shows though he sees them—in accordance with the scriptural text 'Having eyes but (behaving) as if he had them not; having ears, but (behaving) as if he had them not, etc.' The same has been stated (elsewhere also): 'He does not see diversity in the waking state, as in dreamless sleep, though he witnesses it because of its (underlying) unity; so also is he passive though (appearing) active—such a one is the knower of Brahman; none other—that is the final truth here.' In his case will be seen to continue habits and tendencies, but only of the right kind—such as were found immediately before self-realisation—as in food and recreation; or he will be indifferent towards both good and bad. So has it been stated—'If one that has awakened to the truth of the secondless (Brahman) should act with license, wherein is the difference between the knower of truth and a dog in respect of eating what is

forbidden ?' Also: 'Transcending even the consciousness that one knows Brahman,—such a one is the knower of the self,—none other.' In that (condition) [**Page 15**] humility, etc., which were once useful in attaining (right) knowledge, and other virtues like mercy, etc., are found (in him) as graces. So has it been stated: 'In one that has awakened to a knowledge of the Self, virtues like kindness make their appearance spontaneously; but they are no longer the means (for anything whatsoever).' Why say more ? Such a person will go on experiencing for the sake of merely (continuing) life's pilgrimage, joys and sorrows which are the result of his *prārabdha-karma* whether desired (by him) or not or desired by others, and illuminating the states of the internal organ, etc. When that (*karma*) is exhausted and when the vital principle is absorbed in the supreme Brahman—the inmost bliss—he remains as the partless Absolute, ignorance and its effects together with all mental impressions disappearing according to the scriptural texts—'His vital breaths do not depart', 'Here alone they dissolve' and 'He is freed, being already free'.

Here ends the *Vedānta-sāra* composed by the illustrious Sadānanda—preceptor of the highest ascetic order.

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